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Hate Wins
Courtney Lauren Anderson*
The controversy surrounding the conflict between hate crimes and the
First Amendment makes the task of even defining hate crimes difficult.
Actions that some find prejudicial are simply expressive to others. This
diversion obstructs efforts to collect data on hate crimes and deploy a unified
legal or prosecutorial response. The antidiscrimination purpose of the Fair
Housing Act is known, despite questions surrounding the Act’s breadth, and
the inconsistent prioritization and interpretation of the Act that comes with
changing the person who holds the position of the Secretary of the Office of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This paper sets forth a framework
to support the inclusion of hate crime eradiation in HUD’s agenda. This
paper illustrates protecting the rights of people to be free from
discrimination while in their homes is an active and appropriate use of the
Fair Housing Act. Furthermore, such a purpose is properly aligned with
HUD’s traditional accomplishments in the areas of home financing, rental
assistance, affordable housing, and homelessness prevention. Therefore,
incorporating hate crime eradication into its agenda would allow HUD to
actively address violent acts that interfere with the pro-integration mission
of HUD and the Fair Housing Act (FHA). Further, providing clarification
regarding the tools to combat housing-related violence supports the
antidiscrimination intent of the Fair Housing Act.
Currently, inconsistencies exist with respect to prosecuting hate crimes
under the FHA and among states and localities with respect to collecting
data on these crimes. Appointing a HUD Secretary who is willing to, at a
minimum, set forth consistent reporting requirements and data collection
requirements will assist with providing a unified approach to combating the
growing problem of housing-related violence.
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INTRODUCTION
Part I provides an introduction to and historical overview of the Office
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This illustrates the purpose
of HUD and also the regular exclusion of hate crimes from the HUD
agenda. Part II provides specific examples of instances when HUD
officials expanded their reach to regulate or interpret the purpose of fair
housing. This expansion included liability for third parties that provide a
platform for internet advertising and to recognize disparate impact as a
cause of action under the Fair Housing Act. This provides support for
continued expansion of HUD to explicitly incorporate the eradication and
mitigation of hate crimes in its agenda. Part III provides an overview of
acts and statutes that address hate crimes via the Fair Housing Act. Part
III also discusses state laws and regulations of hate crimes, particularly
any data collection mandates. The inconsistencies among these laws and
regulations, and the lack of a comprehensive data collection exemplify
the benefits of a unified agenda for addressing hate crimes and how the
Fair Housing Act can provide a foundation for such an initiative.
Housing-related violence has been increasing, and Part IV further
explains why HUD’s response should be clearly outlined in its agenda
and gives specific action items to do so. A reminder of the integrationist
purpose of the FHA is the basis of the conclusion in Part V.
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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE OFFICE OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
The federal government has been providing affordable housing to the
low-income population since the 1930s with a focus mainly on the
mortgage market and in promoting construction of low-rent public
housing. Today, the federal government focuses on rental housing
assistance, assistance to state and local governments, and assistance to
homeowners. Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides most of
these programs through housing assistance programs, such as Section 8
vouchers and project-based rental assistance,1 public housing,2 housing
for the elderly,3 housing for persons with disabilities,4 rural rental
assistance,5 Community Development Block Grants (CDBG),6 HOME
Investment Partnerships Block Grants,7 Low-Income Housing Tax

1. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2019); see also U.S. Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75–
412, § 9, 50 Stat. 888, 891 (authorizing assistance of low rentals); see also Housing Choice
Vouchers
Fact
Sheet,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HOUS.
&
URB.
DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8
[https://perma.cc/DLB2-APY6] (last visited June 5, 2020) (describing housing choice vouchers).
2. See HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog [https://perma.cc/BYG5-CB8L] (last visited
June 5, 2020) (explaining the purpose of public housing, who is eligible for it, and how to apply
for it).
3. See The National Housing Act of 1959 § 202, 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (describing statute’s
purpose of supporting the elderly); see also 24 C.F.R. § 891.100 (2019) (program regulations)
(describing the general program purpose of aiding the elderly).
4. See The National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 § 811, 42 U.S.C. § 8013 (describing
statute’s purpose of aiding those with disabilities); 24 C.F.R. § 891.100 (2019) (describing the
general program purpose of aiding persons with disabilities); see also Section 811 Supportive
Housing for People with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/mfh/progdesc/disab811 [https://perma.cc/S6WLAZJ6] (last visited June 5, 2020) (describing Section 811’s supportive housing for persons with
disabilities).
5. See The Housing Act of 1949 § 521, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (describing the statute’s purpose of
providing adequate housing for rural families); see also 7 C.F.R. § 3560.254 (2020) (outlining
eligibility requirements for rental assistance).
6. See Community Development, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment
[https://perma.cc/GW9W-9VA9] (May 4, 2020) (describing several Community Development
Block Grant programs).
7. See Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 § 211, 42 U.S.C. § 12741
(describing Department of Housing and Development’s authority under the act); see also Home
Investment Partnerships Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/affordablehousing/programs/home/
[https://perma.cc/W3P6-VCMY] (May 19, 2020) (summarizing the scope of the HOME investment
partnerships program).
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Credits (LIHTC),8 homeless assistance programs,9 FHA and Veterans’
Administration mortgage insurance,10 and the mortgage interest
deduction in the tax code.11 The goal for most of these housing programs
is to provide affordable housing for low-income families, meaning only
30% of the family income is spent on housing. Since the inception of the
Fair Housing Act, the federal government has enacted a variety of laws
designed to increase housing equity.
In 1936, President Franklin Roosevelt won the popular vote by the
third largest margin of victory in United States’ history, carrying every
state except Maine and Vermont.12 Just two years prior, at a time when
unemployment was high and banks were failing, President Roosevelt
signed the National Housing Act of 1934, creating the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA).13 The FHA home mortgage insurance program
was “designed to restore stability to the nation’s housing markets, boost
homebuilding, provide jobs, and increase home purchases by easing
mortgage credit.”14 After the 1936 landslide victory, the Roosevelt
Administration continued to advance its New Deal policies. These
8. See Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. OFF. OF POL’Y
DEV. & RSCH., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html [https://perma.cc/PHY3LA8H] (June 5, 2020) (describing the purpose, scope, and inception of the LIHTC under HUD).
9. See generally Homelessness Assistance Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.
EXCH., https://www.hudexchange.info/homelessness-assistance/ [https://perma.cc/PHY3-LA8H]
(last visited June 5, 2020).
10. See generally The Federal Fair Housing Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB.
DEV., https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/fhahistory [https://perma.cc/2D74-TJQ4]
(last visited June 5, 2020); Veterans and HUD, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/veteran_information/Veterans_and_HUD
[https://perma.cc/7T3PH7YU] (last visited June 5, 2020).
11. See 26 U.S.C. § 25 (outlining the allowance of credit in regard to interest on certain home
mortgages); Common Questions from First-Time Homebuyers, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/common_questions [https://perma.cc/7T3P-H7YU] (last visited June
5, 2020) (“[W]hen you own your home, you can deduct the cost of your mortgage loan interest
from your federal income taxes, and usually from your state taxes.”).
12. See Jugal K. Patel & Wilson Andrews, Trump’s Electoral College Victory Ranks 46th in 58
Elections, NY TIMES (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/18/
us/elections/donald-trump-electoral-college-popular-vote.html
[https://perma.cc/GNZ9-QUAJ]
(showing the margin by which Franklin Roosevelt won the popular vote); see also Michael Levy,
United States Presidential Election of 1936, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Oct. 27, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/event/United-States-presidential-election-of-1936
[https://perma.cc/Q55Z-EFFV] (emphasizing the number of states the Roosevelt carried in the
election).
13. LAWRENCE L. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF HUD 2 (2006); see generally The Housing Act
of 1959, 12 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.; see also COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, SOCIAL
SECURITY IN AMERICA 57 (1937) (“In July 1934, on the basis of the American Federation of Labor
estimates, 64.9 percent of all persons engaged in construction industries were unemployed, 38.1
percent in service industries, 37.4 percent in mining, 36.2 percent in railroads, 27.4 percent in
manufacturing, 19.5 percent in trade, 5.1 percent in public service, and 1.1 percent in agriculture.”).
14. THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 2 (describing the purpose behind the FHA home mortgage
insurance program).
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programs focused on the “3 Rs”: relief for the unemployed and poor,
recovery of the economy back to normal levels, and reform of the
financial system to prevent a repeat depression.15 In 1937, the SeventyFifth United States Congress enacted the Housing Act of 1937, also
known as the Wagner-Steagall Act, after sponsors.16 “On September 1,
1937, President Roosevelt signed the bill which was to begin a ‘new era
in the economic and social life of America.’”17 In just a few decades, the
Housing Act of 1937 would lead to the establishment of the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
The Depression-era 1937 Act “was designed to create jobs and to serve
as a slum clearance plan. The bill would provide financial assistance for
housing ‘to alleviate present and recurring unemployment and to remedy
the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of
decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families of low income.’”18 Under
the Act, public housing would be built by local public housing authorities
(PHAs) rather than by the federal government.19 The Act also created the
United States Housing Authority which was authorized to “make loans to
public-housing agencies to assist the development, acquisition, or
administration of low-rent-housing or slum-clearance projects by such
agencies.”20 Under the Act, a PHA and the federal government would
execute an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC), setting forth the parties
rights and obligations. In accordance with the ACC, the PHA would fund
the purchase of land and the construction of housing by issuing long term
bonds, typically with a forty-year maturity.21 The federal government is
then obligated to make all debt service payments on the bonds
(effectively subsidizing all capital costs) and the PHA would operate the
public housing in a manner consistent with federal statutes and
regulations.22
Under the 1937 Act, public housing was expected to serve workingclass families; no ongoing federal subsidy was provided to make the units
affordable. Rents were set at the level needed to operate the
15. See CAROL BERKIN ET AL., MAKING AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 629–
30 (6th ed. 2014) (explaining the purpose behind Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation).
16. See generally United States Housing Act of 1937 (Wagner-Steagall Housing Act), Pub. L.
No. 75–412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1404a–1440).
17. Lawrence M. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
642, 642 (1966).
18. Herbert R. Giorgio, Jr., HUD’s Obligation to “Affirmatively Further” Fair Housing: A
Closer Look at Hope VI, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 183, 185 (2006).
19. Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public
Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 894 (1990).
20. U.S. Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75–412, § 9, 50 Stat. 888, 891 (1937).
21. Schill, supra note 19, at 895 (describing how the PHA funds land and construction for the
purpose of public housing).
22. See id. (explaining the federal government’s role under the Act).
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development—not make a profit—and rents were thus reasonably
affordable. Public housing, therefore, started its life as a financially stable
program.23 Following enactment of the 1937 Act, various states passed
enabling legislation, formed local housing authorities, and investment in
public housing flourished.24 The New Deal era polices reflected an
attempt to address the volatile relationship between capital markets and
housing prices by segregating housing finance from general capital
markets.25 In doing so, the federal government allotted substantial funds
to subsidize the housing capital market and set up a regulatory system for
housing finance.26 At the time, economic stabilization and rationalization
of capital movement played a major role in federal housing policy.27
The New Deal objectives were pursued primarily through the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) and affiliated agencies, a system of
federal support for regulation of savings and loan banks engaged with
home mortgage lending.28 In addition to the FHLBB, from 1932 to 1947,
the federal government established five other organizations designed to
address and aid housing: the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC),29 the Federal Housing Administration (FHA),30
the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), 31 the home
financing division of the Veteran’s Administration,32 and the Housing
and Home Finance Agency (HHFA).33 The FHLBB was established in
1932 but was restructured during FDR’s administration and served as the
foundation for the New Deal strategy. It was designed to deal primarily

23. Anne Marie Smetak, Private Funding, Public Housing: The Devil in the Details, 21 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 6 (2014).
24. See Friedman, supra note 17, at 642 (describing the immediate aftermath of the enactment
of the 1937 Act).
25. See Harold A. McDougall, Affordable Housing for the 1990’s, 20 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM
727, 733 (1987) (“The New Deal sought to counter this dangerous volatility by segregating housing
finance from general capital markets.”).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Home Owners’ Loan Corporation), DC HISTORIC SITES,
https://historicsites.dcpreservation.org/items/show/194 [https://perma.cc/2JBQ-HEE6] (last visited
Aug. 4, 2020).
29. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–479, tit. IV, 48 Stat. 1246, 1257.
30. See tit. I (creating the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) “to encourage improvements
in housing standards and conditions [and] to provide a system of mutual mortgage insurance.”).
31. See 12 U.S.C.§ 1717 (creating the Federal National Mortgage Association).
32. See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78–346, 58 Stat. 284, 284
(describing the benefits for veterans for the purchase or construction of homes, farms, and business
property).
33. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1947, 12 F.R. 4981, § 5, 61 Stat. 954 (making the FHA a
department of the HHFA); McDougall, supra note 25, at 734 (describing the different government
authorities established from 1932 to 1947).
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with the secondary mortgage market.34 In 1933, the institution was
reoriented in purpose and began chartering federal savings and other loan
institutions to serve the home mortgage financing market.35 In 1934, the
FHA was created and chartered to “facilitate home ownership, encourage
uniformity among lending institutions, and upgrade housing stock,” and
provided home mortgage insurance.36 Despite the repeated attempts at
addressing housing in the United States, the creation of public housing
sputtered. From 1937 to 1948, only 117,000 public housing units were
constructed with 25,000 additional units deferred because of World War
II.37
In 1947, the federal government consolidated its housing programs and
institutions under the Housing Home Finance Agency (HHFA),38 the
predecessor to the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). In 1949, Congress again revisited the need for public housing
when it amended the Housing Act of 1937 and passed the Housing Act
of 1949, signed by President Truman. The 1949 Act sought to
“[eliminate] substandard and other inadequate housing through the
clearance of slums and blighted areas.”39 The 1949 Act was designed to
address the issues related to inhabitance in our country’s densely
populated and rapidly growing cities. With this declaration, the Act
established the national housing policy of “[a] decent home and a suitable
living environment for every American family” in order to “contribut[e]
to the development and redevelopment of communities and to the
advancement of the growth, wealth, and security of the Nation.”40 In
essence, the 1949 Act created a mission to “improve the physical, social,
and economic health of cities.”41 To meet these “health of cities” goals,
the 1949 Act provided federal subsidies to aid in the clearance of slums
and promote urban redevelopment.42 Congress authorized construction
of 810,000 more public housing units as part of the Act. They were not
completed until over twenty years later.43
The 1950s reflected a paradigm shift in how public housing was
perceived. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, public housing was met with
34. See McDougall, supra note 25, at 733–34 (“The FHLBB tinkers with the secondary
mortgage market . . . .”).
35. Id. at 734.
36. Id.
37. JAMES RUSSELL PRESCOTT, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PUBLIC HOUSING 24 (1974).
38. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1947, 12 F.R. 4981, § 5, 61 Stat. 954.
39. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81–171, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, 413 (1949).
40. Id.
41. THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 6 (explaining HUD’s third core mission).
42. See Schill, supra note 19, at 895 (describing the purpose of the 1949 Act).
43. See id. at 895–96 (“Congress authorized the construction of an additional 810,000 public
housing units . . .”).
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criticism and skepticism. Projects were intended to be temporary until
residents could get back on their feet, and often were segregated by race
and built in less desirable neighborhoods where their presence would not
be “offensive” to community residents.44 Federal government policies
and programs facilitated the movement of middle- and moderate-income
households out of the city and into the suburbs. At roughly the same time,
black migration from the rural south to northern cities accelerated.45 As
many jobs followed white flight to the suburbs, inner cities became home
to low-income and minority households.46 As a result, “public housing
no longer served as a temporary haven for upwardly mobile households,
but instead became a permanent home to a very poor and
disproportionately nonwhite population.”47
In the decades that followed, the policies stemming from the New Deal
era and postwar America would continue to establish public housing as a
cornerstone of American society, and the economic base and ethnic
profile of public housing tenants would categorically shift.
II. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND NOTABLE
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
A. Origin and Purpose
The 1960s saw a boom in public housing development.48 The cost of
operating and constructing public housing increased, which resulted in
the creation of substandard high rises to lower the cost of land and
development. Furthermore, the increase in inventory did not prevent the
ongoing segregation which, in addition to the underfunding of the

44. See id. at 896 (explaining the Act was meant to be a temporary solution).
45. DANIEL R. FUSFELD & TIMOTHY BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN
GHETTO 49–50 (Susan H. Wilson ed., 1984).
46. See Schill, supra note 19, at 896 (arguing that manufacturing jobs followed the pattern of
migration away from central cities and towards the suburbs); see also Alana Semuels, White Flight
Never Ended, THE ATLANTIC (July 30, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/white-flight-alive-and-well/399980/ [https://perma.cc/RZ4M-XFEH] (citing the
Kerner Report which “castigated white society for fleeing to suburbs, where they excluded blacks
from employment, housing, and educational opportunities.”).
47. Schill, supra note 19, at 896 (explaining that increasing manufacturing jobs brought many
white employees to the suburbs, leaving behind a mostly poor, nonwhite population).
48. See Michael S. FitzPatrick, A Disaster in Every Generation: An Analysis of HOPE VI:
HUD’s Newest Big Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 421, 431 (2000);
see also Alexander von Hoffman, History Lessons for Today’s Housing Policy: The Political
Processes of Making Low-Income Housing Policy, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV. 1,
24, 33 (Aug. 2012), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/w12-5_von_hoffman.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L3AB-HGU3] (noting that in 1968, the Johnson administration adopted the
Kaiser committee goals for “300,000 new housing units for low- and middle-income families [in
1969]—more than half of the production of the previous ten years—and 6 million in the following
decade”).

2020]

Hate Wins

233

physical structures, caused the failure of many public housing
structures.49 The importance of affordable and public housing was
illustrated by President Johnson’s decision to make affordable housing a
key component of his administration’s policy objectives.50 In 1965,
Congress enacted the Department of Housing and Urban Development
Act to consolidate a plethora of older federal agencies created during the
1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. In the 1965 Act, Congress gave HUD its guided
mission, stating:
[I]n recognition of the increasing importance of housing and urban development in our national life, the Congress finds that establishment of
an executive department is desirable to achieve the best administration
of the principal programs of the Federal Government which provide assistance for housing and for the development of the Nation’s communities; to assist the President in achieving maximum coordination of the
various Federal activities which have a major effect upon urban community, suburban, or metropolitan development; to encourage the solution of problems of housing, urban development, and mass transportation through State, county, town, village, or other local and private
action, including promotion of interstate, regional, and metropolitan cooperation; to encourage the maximum contributions that may be made
by vigorous private homebuilding and mortgage lending industries to
housing, urban development, and the national economy; and to provide
for full and appropriate consideration, at the national level, of the needs
and interests of the Nation’s communities and of the people who live
and work in them.51

The 1965 Act established the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) as a cabinet-level agency, thereby replacing HHFA.
For the first time, “urban” was reflected in the agency’s title.52 On
January 18, 1966, Robert C. Weaver—an economist, the incumbent
HHFA Administrator, and a former member of President Roosevelt’s
“Black Cabinet”53—was appointed the first Secretary of HUD.54 Weaver
was also the first African American to serve in a President’s cabinet in

49. See FitzPatrick, supra note 48, at 431 (remarking that many of the new high-rise structures
“were ill-conceived from their inception and were under-funded, both in construction and
maintenance.”).
50. Paulette J. Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues
Requiring Systemic Solutions, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 413, 429 (2004).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 3531 (1965).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 3532.
53. James Barron, Robert C. Weaver, 89, First Black Cabinet Member, Dies, NY TIMES (July
19, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/19/nyregion/robert-c-weaver-89-first-black-cabinetmember-dies.html [https://perma.cc/WTA7-CZ25].
54. HUD
HISTORY,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HOUS.
&
URB.
DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/about/hud_history [https://perma.cc/9B5T-599Z] (last visited Aug. 18,
2020).

234

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

American history.55 While in office, Weaver championed the Fair
Housing Act of 1968, stating, “you cannot have physical renewal . . .
without human renewal.”56
The year 1973 was another monumental year in the history of public
housing in this country. From 1962 to 1972, HUD’s budget increased
336%.57 Due to the growing skepticism surrounding the feasibility, cost,
effectiveness, and manageability of HUD’s major initiatives, President
Nixon decided to halt additional funding for many of these programs,
including the section 235 homeownership program, public housing, all
private rental assistance programs, and the major health of cities
programs.58 This 1973 funding freeze marked the end of the HUD’s early
era.59
In 1974, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was
enacted and signed by President Ford, ushering in HUD’s modern era.60
The 1974 Act reflected three fundamental policy shifts: (1) reduced
emphasis on public housing construction to focus on the new Section 8
“project-based” rental assistance program, (2) introduction of the “tenantbased” Section 8 program, and (3) consolidation of seven of HUD’s
health of cities programs into the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG).61
B. Overview of Select HUD Programs
Section 8 housing vouchers, also called the Section 8 Housing Choice
Voucher program, are tenant-based rental assistance (TBRA) that are
funded by the federal government and administered by local public
55. Barron, supra note 53 (Weaver’s obituary crediting him with being the first African
American appointed to the Cabinet).
56. Merrill Fabry, The Long Fight to Appoint the First African-American Cabinet Secretary,
TIME (Jan. 13, 2016), https://time.com/4175137/first-african-american-cabinet-member/
[https://perma.cc/84LN-4ZQK].
57. THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 10 (demonstrating the expansion of HUD programs from 1962
to 1972).
58. Id.; see also MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34591, OVERVIEW OF
FEDERAL
HOUSING
ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS
AND
POLICY
25
(2014),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=752738 [https://perma.cc/4YWK-3ST8] (describing the shift
from construction subsidies to rent subsidies under the Nixon administration); see generally 1930
to 2020, U.S. DEP’T. HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/hud_timeline/
[https://perma.cc/VYZ3-VJ22] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020) (discussing the moratorium on new
housing programs ordered by President Nixon).
59. See THOMPSON, supra note 13, at 9–10 (finding that President Nixon ordered HUD to no
longer pursue new commitments).
60. See id. at 11 (discussing the major policy shifts established by the 1974 act). See generally
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5301).
61. See THOMPSON, supra note 13 at 11 (“The unifying theme [of the 1974 Act] was to move
in the direct of program restructuring, consolidation, and devolution . . . .”).
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housing authorities (PHAs) to private landlords on behalf of low-income
families.62 The vouchers allow low-income families to live in privatemarket housing of their choice by paying for the difference between the
family’s contribution and the actual rent of the housing.63 The family’s
contribution to rent is 30% of the family’s adjusted gross income, and the
PHA pays the difference based on the maximum subsidy set by the PHA,
based on the local fair market value established by HUD. 64 For a family
to be low-income status and thus eligible for the vouchers, they must earn
less than 80% of the local area median and meet other criteria, such as
elderly or disabled.65 For a family to be considered very low-income, they
must earn less than 50% of the local area median.66 This distinction is
important because PHAs must provide 75% of all vouchers to very lowincome families.67 Families are not automatically entitled to the vouchers
just because of their income, age or ability status.68 Families must apply
for the vouchers at their local PHA. If approved, they are placed on a
waiting list for Congress’s approval.69 The process could take anywhere
from several months to a couple years before the families receive a
voucher.70 Congress generally renews all two million vouchers it has

62. See MAGGIE MCCARTY ET. AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44495, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
URBAN
DEVELOPMENT
(HUD):
FY2017
APPROPRIATIONS
6
(2017),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44495 [https://perma.cc/9VFY-BPK4] (explaining
the Section 8 program); see MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 6 (explaining the role of PHAs in
voucher programs); see generally 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2020).
63. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 8.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see generally Subject: Transmittal of Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 Public Housing/Section 8
Income Limits, OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RSCH.: U.S. DEP’T OF. HOUS. & URB. DEV. (Jan. 7, 1998),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il/fmr98/sect8.html [https://perma.cc/6SRD-UKKD]; see
generally Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8
[https://perma.cc/F4JQ-AJW2] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020).
66. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 8 (2014).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(4) (defining “low-income family”); MCCARTY ET AL., supra note
58, at 8 (specifying that 75% of all vouchers in a year must be set aside for extremely low-income
families).
68. See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 9 (“Families that wish to receive a voucher must
generally apply to their local PHA and are placed on a waiting list . . . .”).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(13)(J) (“A public housing agency shall select families to receive
project-based assistance pursuant to this paragraph from its waiting list for assistance under this
subsection.”); see also MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 9 (discussing the tenant selection process
and use of the waiting list).
70. See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 9 (explaining the time spent on the waiting list
varies by community, ranging from several months to a couple years); see also Maya Miller, What
You Need to Know About How Section 8 Really Works, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 9, 2020, 5:30 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/what-you-need-to-know-about-how-section-8-really-works
[https://perma.cc/B9LD-MAQG] (exploring how to apply for Section 8 housing).
AND
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authorized and funded each year.71
The Section 8 voucher program is the largest of HUD’s rental
assistance programs, with roughly a third of the department’s budget
going to the voucher program.72 Since the Section 8 voucher program is
the largest program in the largest account (rental assistance programs), it
has predictably been the source of the most contentious funding issues
each year. With two million vouchers in need of renewal each year and
costs based completely on the housing market and tenant incomes, this
annual controversy is no surprise.73 The TBRA account also provides
funds for administrative costs incurred by the PHAs that administer the
program.74
Somewhat similar to Section 8 vouchers, public housing developments
are owned and operated by local PHAs and funded and regulated by the
federal government through HUD.75 Also, like Section 8 vouchers, public
housing tenants must pay 30% of their adjusted gross income to rent.76
PHAs receive funding from HUD to make up the difference between
what the tenants pay and what it cost to maintain the public housing
development.77 Families are eligible for public housing if they are lowincome, meaning they are at or below 80% of the area median income.78
Families at or below 30% of the area median income are considered
extremely low-income for public housing purposes, and 40% of public
housing units must be made available for extremely low-income
families.79 Public housing is the second-largest direct housing assistance
program behind Section 8 vouchers with 1.2 million public housing units
under contract with the federal government.80
Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD) is a program started by the

71. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 9. However, some years Congress has authorized new
vouchers called incremental vouchers. Id.
72. Id.
73. See MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 62, at 6–7; see also MCCARTY ET AL., supra
note 58, at 9 (explaining that Congress renews about 2 million vouchers each year); see also
MAGGIE MCCARTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44931, HUD FY2018 APPROPRIATIONS: IN BRIEF
6 (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44931 [https://perma.cc/C4ZS-4MSX]
(explaining that Section 8 allocations are contentious every year because it is the largest part of the
program budget); see also MAGGIE MCCARTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45294, HUD FY2019
APPROPRIATIONS: IN BRIEF 8 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45294
[https://perma.cc/H99H-627Y] (exploring how this large federal housing program has changed and
developed over a span of a few years).
74. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 62, at 6.
75. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 8.
76. Id.
77. Id. See generally Housing Choice Voters Fact Sheet, supra note 65.
78. 24 C.F.R. § 982.201(b) (2020); see MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 8.
79. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 9–10.
80. Id. at 10.
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Obama administration in fiscal year 2012.81 RAD is not a normal
program that requires funding from HUD to do what it is intended.
Rather, RAD works by converting a limited number of HUD-assisted
housing programs to Section 8 rental assistance programs,82 and because
RAD does not receive funding, the conversion must be cost-neutral.83
However, in recent years, presidential budget requests have requested
funds for RAD to allow for conversions that are not cost-neutral.84
The Community Development Block Grant program (CDBG) is
administered by HUD and aimed at primarily low- and moderate-income
individuals. The purpose of CDBG is to develop decent housing, a
suitable living environment, and expand economic opportunities for these
targeted individuals.85 The CDBG distributes 70% of its funds to central
cities of metropolitan areas, cities with populations of at least 50,000, and
urban counties.86 The remaining 30% of the funds go to states to use in
small communities that are listed above.87 Of the funds given to
communities through CDBG, 70% of it must go to the benefit of low- and
moderate-income persons.88 This includes “acquisition and rehabilitation
of property for public works, urban beautification, historic preservation;
the demolition of blighted properties; services such as crime prevention,
child care, drug abuse counseling, education, or recreation; neighborhood
economic development projects; and the rehabilitation or development of
housing . . . .”89
The HOME Investment Partnerships Program is another program
administered by HUD with the purpose of expanding the supply of
decent, safe, sanitary, and affordable housing.90 For the HOME program,
81. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 62, at 12; About RAD Public Housing, U.S. DEP’T
HOUS. & URB. DEV., https://www.hud.gov/RAD/program-details [https://perma.cc/X47B6G7T] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020); see generally Rental Assistance Demonstration: Final Program
Notice, 77 Fed. Reg. 43,850 (July 26, 2012).
82. See MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 62, at 12 (explaining the function of RAD); see
also Rental Assistance Demonstration (RAD), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. 1–2,
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/TOOLKIT1WHYRAD.PDF
[https://perma.cc/3ZBK7DQW] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020) (discussing that projects must be able to undergo a cost-neutral
conversion because RAD has never received funding).
83. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 62, at 12.
84. Id.; see MAGGIE MCCARTY, supra note 73, at 7 (“The President’s FY2017 budget request
included $50 million to fund RAD in order to allow units that cannot undergo a cost-neutral
conversion to participate.”).
85. See MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 16 (discussing the purpose of the grants).
See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1706e (repealed Nov. 28 1990).
86. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 16.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 17 (describing the purpose of the Program); see also Home Investment
OF
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60% of the funds go to participating jurisdictions that have a population
above a certain threshold, and the remaining 40% are awarded to nonparticipating jurisdictions.91 The HOME funds specifically go to
rehabilitation of owner-occupied housing, homebuyer assistance, rental
housing construction and rehabilitation, and the provision of tenant-based
rental assistance.92 “All HOME funds must go to benefit low-income
families (income at or below 80% of the area median income), and at least
90% of funds for rental housing activities or tenant-based rental
assistance must be used to benefit families with incomes at or below 60%
of area median income.”93 This just means a subset of the funds goes to
benefit a bigger portion of the low-income population, but still benefits
low-income families.
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) is an agency that is now
within HUD and insures private lenders against losses on certain home
mortgages.94 This works to incentivize lenders that would not normally
give loans to individuals with low down payments or little credit history
by insuring lenders against the loss.95 FHA-insured borrowers pay
insurance premiums to the FHA and not the lenders, but the FHA limits
the amount of the loan the borrowers can receive.96 The FHA provides
borrowers with a variety of mortgage insurance products, such as reverse
mortgages for the elderly; loans for the purchase, repair, or construction
of apartments, hospitals, and nursing homes; and for an assortment of
special purpose loans.97 Government National Mortgage Association
(Ginnie Mae) provides mortgage-backed securities made up of
government-insured mortgages and establishes offsetting receipts when

Partnerships Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV. (May 19, 2020),
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/affordablehousing/programs/home/
[https://perma.cc/97UV-83F9] (summarizing the program).
91. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 17; KATIE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40118, AN OVERVIEW OF THE HOME INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS PROGRAM 13 (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40118.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MG8-DN8N].
92. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 17, 21.
93. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 17; KATIE JONES, supra note 91, at 7.
94. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 21; see also KATIE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS20530, FHA-INSURED HOME LOANS: AN OVERVIEW 2–3 (2019) (describing the FHA’s
purpose and relationship to HUD).
95. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 21; see also Marie Justine Fritz, Federal Housing Administration (FHA), ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Aug. 9, 2019), www.britannica.com/topic/Federal-Housing-Administration [www.perma.cc/AF82-NRTG] (describing the history and function
of the FHA).
96. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 58, at 21.
97. Id.; see also Let FHS Loans Help You, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/buying/loans [www.perma.cc/Q36R-DVAR] (last visited Aug. 3, 2020)
(noting what products are available for different customers).
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the fees it collects exceed any payments made on its guarantee.98 Both of
these offsets are based on the expectations about the housing market, the
economy, the credit quality of borrowers, and relevant fee levels, which
fall outside the control of the policymakers.99 These programs offset the
HUD budget if the estimated cash inflows exceed the estimated cash
outflows. In other words, if the insured loans are expected to earn more
money for the government than they cost the government, then the
program will have a negative credit subsidy to offset the HUD budget.100
C. HUD and Hate Crimes
To date, HUD’s major programs include mortgage and loan insurance
through the Federal Housing Administration, Community Development
(CDBG) to help communities with economic development, job
opportunities and housing rehabilitation, aid development and support for
housing for low-income residents through the HOME investment
Partnership Act block grants, rental assistance through the Section 8
program including certificates and vouchers, public or subsidized
housing for low-income individuals and families, fair housing education
and enforcement, and homelessness assistance.101 However, the
programs do not directly address overt acts of racism that exclude
minorities from neighborhoods as an underlying factor for housing
inequities. It is worth mentioning that HUD, like every other executive
agency, does not exist in a vacuum. The history of HUD and its
accomplishments are shaped by external forces, including political
influence and pressure, social movements, budgets, and the will of its
secretary. Hate crimes have been taken up by the legislature and statistics
have been collected by the FBI and Department of Justice.102 To date,
very little, if any hate crime policy, has been included as part of the HUD
Secretary’s policies.
Secretary Samuel Pierce discussed 24 CFR 100.400, promulgated in
1989, which codifies the illegality of harassing a person due to their status
in a protected class a housing context.103 The remarks were given while
98. MAGGIE MCCARTY, supra note 73, at 9; see generally ECONOMIC POLICY PROGRAM
HOUSING COMMISSION, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, GINNIE MAE: HOW DOES IT WORK AND
WHAT
DOES
IT
DO?,
1
(Dec.
6,
2013)
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/GinnieMae-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9HM-UXKS].
99. MAGGIE MCCARTY, supra note 73, at 9.
100. MAGGIE MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 62, at 14.
101. Questions and Answers About HUD, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
www.hud.gov/about/qaintro [https://perma.cc/3XPU-SYXZ] (last accessed Aug. 17, 2020).
102. See generally 2018 Hate Crime Statistics Released, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/facts-and-statistics [www.perma.cc/CQ7C-LEMD] (last accessed
Aug. 17, 2020).
103. See also Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3,232
(Jan. 23, 1989) (implementing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988).
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serving as the HUD secretary under President Reagan.104 In 2010,
Secretary Shaun Donovan discussed the murders of Matthew Shepard
and James Byrd, Jr., which led to the Hate Crimes Prevention Act,
Division E of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010.105 The Act added certain crimes motivated by a victim’s actual or
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity to the list of hate crimes
covered by existing federal law.106 Other than these two HUD secretaries,
an explicit mention of hate crimes is missing from all HUD secretaries’
agendas. Including hate crimes in the agenda for HUD would be a break
from traditional HUD priorities. However, HUD has been taking on more
nontraditional topics lately with disparate impact and internet
advertising.107 Both of these topics align with the intent of the FHA to
fight discrimination and to create truly integrated living patterns. The
next part explains how disparate impact and third-party internet
advertising are reshaping perspectives on the Fair Housing Act.
III. NONTRADITIONAL HUD ACTIONS
A. Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 1968 seeks to provide, within
constitutional limitations, fair housing in the United States.108 The FHA
bans practices that are motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose and
those that “have a disparate impact on minorities.”109 In the years
following the Act’s enactment, most states and local governments passed
their own equivalents to the FHA.110 The FHA aims to ensure that a clear
104. Joseph Foote, As They Saw It: HUD’s Secretaries Reminisce About Carrying Out the
Mission,
1
CITYSCAPE
71,
86
(1995),
https://www.huduser.gov/Periodicals/CITYSCPE/VOL1NUM3/foote.pdf.
105. See generally National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 11184, Division E–Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 123 Stat. 2190,
2835 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42, 18 U.S.C.); Eliott C. McLaughlin,
There Are Two Names on the Federal Hate Crimes Law. One is Matthew Shepard. The Other Is
James Byrd Jr., CNN (Apr. 25, 2019, 8:15 AM), www.cnn.com/2019/04/24/us/james-byrd-hatecrime-legislation-john-king-execution/index.html [https://perma.cc/L26S-LTRQ].
106. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84,
Division E-Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 123 Stat. 2190,
2839–41 (2009) (expanding the 1969 United States federal hate-crime law to include crimes
motivated by a victim’s actual or perceived gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
disability).
107. Infra Part III.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
109. Courtney Lauren Anderson, Integrate and Reactivate the 1968 Fair Housing Mandate, 13
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 2 (2016).
110. Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory Municipal Services Under the
Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717, 722 n.28 (2008); ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION §30:3 (Thomson Reuters, July 2020 Update) (discussing
which state and local jurisdictions prohibit housing discrimination and what factors are considered).
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national policy of fair housing can be achieved in the United States
without perpetuating segregation or creating discriminatory practices.111
The thrust of the FHA is found in §§ 3604 and 3608, which prohibits
discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling or in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling.112 Furthermore,
§ 3604 prohibits discriminatory intent in representing dwelling
availability for inspection, sale, or rental to a party.113 In sum, § 3604
seeks to prohibit acts that prevent certain individuals from attaining
housing due to their membership in a protected class and to provide a
cause of action when prohibited actions occur.114
Section 3608(a) authorizes HUD to administer the FHA.115
Additionally, this section requires “all executive departments and
agencies [to] administer their program and activities relating to housing
and urban development (including any federal agency having regulatory
or supervisory authority over financial institutions) in a manner
affirmatively to further the purposes of the [FHA].”116 To comply with
§ 3608, governmental agencies must proactively use their resources to
assist with actions to end discrimination in public housing.117 In 1994,
President Clinton expanded HUD’s authority to increase fair housing
opportunities and reduce segregation.118 The order also established the
President’s Fair Housing Council, a cabinet-level organization designed
to promote coordination across the executive branch in affirmatively
furthering fair housing.119
Plaintiffs have brought disparate impact claims under the FHA in three
areas: lending, exclusionary zoning, and urban renewal.120 In each of
111. Courtney Lauren Anderson, Affirmative Action for Affordable Housing, 60 HOWARD L.J.
105, 125 (2016). See also 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (“It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), 3608.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
114. Anderson, supra note 111, at 118 (describing the prohibitions set forth by § 3604);
Anderson, supra note 109, at 2 (describing the prohibitions set forth by § 3604 of the Act).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d).
117. Anderson, supra note 111, at 119 (describing how to comply with § 3608).
118. Anderson, supra note 109, at 7 (describing Clinton’s executive order and the expansion of
HUD’s authority).
119. Id.
120. Michael G. Allen et al., Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule: A Practitioner’s
Perspective, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 162 (2014); see, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief and Damages, Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo, 677 F.Supp.2d 847 (No. 08-062)
(involving a novel challenge to “reverse redlining” in neighborhoods of color in Baltimore
following an unprecedented crisis of residential mortgage foreclosures); Greater New Orleans Fair
Hous. Action Ctr. v. Saint Bernard Parish, 641 F.Supp.2d 563, 565 (E.D. La. 2009) (challenging
zoning ordinances in post-Katrina New Orleans that limited housing availability and
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these contexts, district courts have found claims cognizable.121 The
federal district courts recognized two types of disparate impacts under the
FHA. The first type requires the plaintiff to show that the challenged
practice imposes a disproportionate harm on members of a protected
class.122 The second type requires a plaintiff show that the challenged
action tends to create, reinforce, or perpetuate patterns of racial
segregation.123
Despite there being two types of disparate impact claims, data shows
that fewer than twenty percent of plaintiffs succeed on FHA disparate
impact claims on appeal.124 Furthermore, even though courts recognize
discriminatory intent claims and disparate impact claims, courts have
been conservative in providing relief for aggrieved parties under the
disparate impact theory because they fear reaching beyond the scope of
harm protected by Congress.125
On July 19, 2013, during Shaun Donovan’s tenure, HUD issued a
proposed rule titled “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing.”126 The
proposed rule codified the burden-shifting framework used by a majority
of federal courts, thereby establishing standards for proving disparate
impact under the FHA.127 Moreover, the rule sought to provide recipients
of HUD funds with the tools they need to fulfill their statutory obligation
“to take steps proactively to overcome historic patterns of segregation,
promote fair housing choice, and foster inclusive communities for all.”128
Pursuant to the rule, HUD would provide data describing the
neighborhood demographics, particularly for those in high poverty areas,
related to race and discriminatory actions such as the ethnicity of

disproportionately affected African American households); Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in
Action, Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
2824 (2013), cert. dismissed, (No. 11-1507), 2013 WL 6050174 bringing a disparate impact
challenge against a redevelopment plan in a predominantly nonwhite neighborhood that allegedly
intended to reduce overcrowding and crime rates).
121. Anderson, supra note 111, at 123 (stating that lower federal courts have found the claim
cognizable in several contexts).
122. Allen, supra note 120, at 170, 178 n.146 (outlining what the defendant must provide in
order to meet their burden).
123. Id.
124. Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of
Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 393
n.222 (2013).
125. Anderson, supra note 109, at 54–55 (describing the relief provided under the disparate
impact theory).
126. Anderson, supra note 109, at 3 (describing the proposed rule titled Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing Act); see generally Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 Fed. Reg.
43,709 (proposed July 19, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
127. 78 Fed. Reg. 43,709.
128. Id. at 43,710.
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residents, segregation and integrations statistics. 129 In essence, HUD’s
2013 proposed rule seeks to aid plaintiffs attempting to prove a prima
facie case for disparate impact brought under § 3604 by supplying data,
the absence of which often acts as a deciding factor in denying relief for
aggrieved plaintiffs.
In 2016, the affirmative duty imposed on the federal government by
the FHA resurfaced in the Supreme Court case Texas Department of
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.
In the Inclusive Communities case, the Supreme Court addressed whether
to recognize the plaintiff’s disparate impact claims under the FHA.130
The Supreme Court first recognized a disparate impact claim in Griggs
v. Duke Power, in which the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”131 Disparate impact
is based on the “reality that private or public actions, even taken without
animus, can have a disproportionately negative impact on particular
groups, especially minorities.”132 Because the FHA provides a cause of
action for any aggrieved party, under the disparate impact theory, “a
plaintiff may allege discrimination based on statistically disparate
impacts of the defendant’s facially neutral practice on members of a
group who share a protected characteristic.”133 To avoid liability under a
disparate impact claim, a defendant must show that the challenged
practice has a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy objective and the
practice is necessary to attain that objective, and there is no other practice
which can achieve the same results that also has a less discriminatory
effect.”134
Prior to the Inclusive Communities decision, eleven of the twelve
circuits to consider disparate impact claims in the housing context held
that the FHA prohibited facially neutral housing practices that create
disparate impacts on protected classes, even in the absence of a

129. Anderson, supra note 109, at 3 (explaining the types of data that HUD would provide).
130. Tex. Dep’t Hous. & Cmty. Aff. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513
(2015).
131. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
132. Anderson, supra note 111, at 121; see also Brief of Hous. Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 11, 17, Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 13-1371).
133. Anderson, supra note 111, at 121 (describing the disparate impact theory); see also Griggs,
401 U.S. at 430 (“Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices.”).
134. Anderson, supra note 111, at 121; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 23, Inclusive Cmtys.,
135 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 13-1371) (describing how disparate impact claims can be made).
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discriminatory intent.135 In Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court
upheld its reasoning from Griggs, finding disparate impact claims
cognizable in other civil rights statutes, such as the Fair Housing Act.136
This broad interpretation of the Fair Housing Act is necessary in order
to further its mission. Updates to the interpretation in the context of
current times is also exemplified by holding online advertising platforms
accountable for fair housing violations in addition to the actual
advertisers.
B. Internet Advertising Under the Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA) prohibits discriminatory
advertising for housing, explicitly in the housing acquisition process.137
In 1991, the Second Circuit defined “preference” as “any ad that would
discourage an ordinary reader of a particular race from answering it.”138
In 1995, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit clarified that
the FHA prohibits the making or publishing of any statement or
advertisement that indicates a preference or limitation based on race or
family status, among other factors.139
Recently, HUD has ventured into regulating internet advertising under
the Fair Housing Act. This can appear ancillary to hate crimes and not
within the traditional definition of housing and thus may seem outside of
the scope of HUD. Nonetheless, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development has reinitiated an investigation into Facebook for enabling
housing advertisers to discriminate against possible renters or purchasers
based on protected characteristics.140 The case was originally opened
after a ProPublica article was published on October 28, 2016, which
reported on potentially discriminatory advertisement targeting
procedures in the Facebook platform.141 However, in November of 2017,
135. Allen, supra note 120, at 156 (”Every circuit to consider the question . . . has held that the
FHA prohibits housing practices that have a disparate impact on a protected group, even in the
absence of discriminatory intent.”).
136. See Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2525 (“[D]isparate-impact claims are cognizable under
the [FHA] upon considering its results-oriented language . . . .”).
137. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (“[It shall be unlawful to] make, print, or publish, or cause to be
made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental
of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination.”).
138. Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1991).
139. See Jancik v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995) (relying on the
FHA’s definition of “preference” in the analysis).
140. See Charge of Discrimination, at 1–6, Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev. v. Facebook, Inc.,
(FHEO No. 18-0323) (describing how Facebook’s advertising platform facilitates discrimination).
141. See Kriston Capps, Behind HUD’s Housing Discrimination Charges Against Facebook,
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HUD ended its initial investigation into Facebook until further notice.142
In April of 2018, a HUD spokesperson said that, “while the agency has
‘made no findings’ in its resumed investigation, it has learned more about
Facebook practices ‘that warrant a deeper level of scrutiny.’”143 If the
complaint moves forward, the issue will be whether Facebook is
protected under the protections of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA) for “interactive computer service[s].”144
The first ProPublica article reported that Facebook allows advertisers
to target users by their interests, background, and “Ethnic Affinity.”145
As part of its investigation, ProPublica purchased an advertisement that
targeted Facebook members who were looking for housing and excluded
anyone with an “‘affinity’ for African-American, Asian-American, or
Hispanic people,” which was quickly approved by Facebook.146 In the
article, Facebook stated that its “policies prohibit using our targeting
options to discriminate” and it “take[s] prompt enforcement action when
[it] determine[s] that ads violate [its] policies.”147 Facebook also stated
that “Ethnic Affinity” is not the same as race, and members are assigned
an “Ethnic Affinity” based on their interactions on Facebook.148 The
exclusive categories, Facebook states, are used by advertisers to test their
marketing platforms, and “Ethnic Affinity” was added as part of a

BLOOMBERG CITY LAB (Mar. 28, 2019, 12:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-28/why-hud-charged-facebook-with-discrimination
[https://perma.cc/RFW8BMBS] (explaining HUD’s charges against Facebook); see also Julia Angwin & Terry Parris Jr.,
Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:00 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisers-exclude-users-by-race
[https://perma.cc/9773-4JFF] (“Ads that exclude people based on race, gender and other sensitive
factors [that] are prohibited by federal law in housing and employment.”).
142. See Julia Angwin et al., Facebook (Still) Letting Housing Advertisers Exclude Users by
Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebookadvertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin
[https://perma.cc/X7BE-DCU4]
(demonstrating that ProPublica could purchase housing advertisements on Facebook, request that
they not be shown to “certain categories of users, such as African Americans, mothers of high
school kids, people interested in wheelchair ramps, Jews, expats from Argentina and Spanish
speakers,” and the ads were approved by Facebook within minutes).
143. See Ali Breland, Facebook Investigated Over Alleged Housing Discrimination, THE HILL
(Apr. 19, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/383992-facebook-is-beinginvestigated-over-alleged-housing-discrimination
[https://perma.cc/P9E5-SGND]
(detailing
HUD’s reopening of the investigation into Facebook).
144. Communications Decency Act (CDA) § 314, 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
145. See Angwin & Parris Jr., supra note 141 (describing the advertisement experiment
ProPublica ran on Facebook).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. (“Facebook assigns members an ‘Ethnic Affinity’ based on pages and posts they
have liked or engaged with on Facebook.”).
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“multicultural advertising” effort.149
In November 2016, shortly after the ProPublica article was published,
consumers filed a class action lawsuit against Facebook in the Northern
District of California.150 The suit challenged the exclusory advertisement
categories as a violation of the Fair Housing Act, as amended, and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.151 Complainants in the suit sought declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, penalties, and monetary damages.152 Defendants
listed in the complaint were Facebook and “Doe Defendants” who had
used the ad platform to “illegally discriminate on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, with advertisements for
employment or housing.”153 The complaint alleged that Facebook’s ad
platform enabled illegal discrimination by allowing ad buyers to target
specific users seeking housing154 and exclude users by selecting an
“Exclude People” option that prevented the ads from being shown to
certain sets of users.155
According to the complaint, advertisements could exclude users based
on race characteristics, such as “African American (US),” “Asian
American (US),” and “Hispanic (US);” familial status characteristics,
such as “Parents (All),” “Divorced,” and “Expectant parents;” sex
characteristics, such as “Moms;” religion characteristics, such as
“Christian,” “Muslim,” or “Sunni Islam;” and national origin
characteristics, such as “Expat (All).”156 Notably, the complaint alleged
that Facebook gave no option to exclude white or Caucasians.157 After
extensive mediation and settlement discussions, the case was settled in
March 2019, with Facebook agreeing to remove discriminatory targeting
options from its ad platform and create a tool that allows users to search
housing options even if the individuals were not in the subject groups for
149. See id. (discussing privacy and public policy manager at Facebook, Steve Satterfield’s
defense of the “ethnic affinity” categorization as a standard industry practice so that advertisers
could compare success of advertisement campaigns, for example, in different languages).
150. See Stephen Engelberg, HUD Has ‘Serious Concerns’ About Facebook’s Ethnic
Targeting, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 7, 2016, 4:27 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/hud-hasserious-concerns-about-facebooks-ethnic-targeting [https://perma.cc/9X5R-SNSB] (recounting
HUD and Facebook response to previous article detailing ad discrimination); Complaint Class
Action, Jury Demand at 1, Onuoha v. Facebook, Inc. (No. 5:16-cv-06440), 2016 WL 6599689
(N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 3, 2016).
151. Complaint Class Action, supra note 150, at 1 (listing the plaintiff’s claims against
Facebook).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2.
154. Id. at 5.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 5–6 (highlighting that Facebook defines “Expat” as “[p]eople whose original
country of residence is different from the current country/countries selected above”).
157. See id. at 6 (citing count 28 that “[t]here is no option in Facebook’s platform to exclude
the ‘demographic’ of White or Caucasian Americans from the target audience.”).
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the advertisements.158
On February 8, 2017, Facebook announced it was developing “updates
to [their] advertising policies, new advertiser education and stronger
enforcement tools.”159 Nevertheless, in November 2017, ProPublica
purchased advertisements that excluded “certain categories of users, such
as African Americans, mothers of high school kids, people interested in
wheelchair ramps, Jews, expats from Argentina and Spanish
speakers.”160 The advertisements were quickly approved without any
self-certification despite the fact that Facebook’s new policies which
supposedly catch and reject discriminatory ads aimed at racial categories
and require self-certification that the ads are compliant with
nondiscrimination laws.161
In March of 2018, the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) and
several other housing groups sued Facebook in the Southern District of
New York.162 The plaintiffs contended that Facebook had violated the
FHA through its advertising tools that “make[] it possible for housing
advertisers to exclude certain home seekers from ever seeing their
ads,”163 based on characteristics prohibited by the FHA, including “sex,
religion, familial status, national origin, and pretexts for protected
characteristics.”164 The complaint cited a Fourth Circuit case stating that
the FHA advertising prohibitions apply to both the individual advertiser
and the publisher.165 Facebook moved to dismiss, arguing that the
Communications Decency Act “immunizes them from the FHA.”166
The CDA protects “interactive computer services” from being treated

158. Facebook Agrees to Advertising Overhaul to Settle Bias Suits, BUS. INS. (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/00010101/-NEWS06-/912327397/Facebook-agreesto-advertising-overhaul-to-settle-bias-suits# [https://perma.cc/GG6N-2A2B].
159. Improving Enforcement and Promoting Diversity: Updates to Ads Policies and Tools,
FACEBOOK (Feb. 8, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/-02/-improving-enforcement-andpromoting-diversity-updates-to-ads-policies-and-tools/ [https://perma.cc/F5K6-GUCX].
160. Angwin, supra note 142 (citing ProPublica’s admission that they purchased advertisements
from Facebook which excluded specific groups).
161. Id.
162. See Complaint at 1, Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-02689
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (documenting NFHA’s allegations against Facebook for housing
discrimination); Craig Timberg & Tracy Jan, HUD Secretary Carson Accuses Facebook of
Enabling Housing Discrimination, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2018, 4:38 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/08/17/facebook-could-be-responsible-howadvertisers-use-its-platform-justice-department-says/ [https://perma.cc/6T6B-WWV9].
163. Complaint, supra note 162, at 1 (quoting count 2 of the Complaint).
164. Statement of Interest of the U.S. at 2, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:18-cv02689-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018).
165. See Complaint, supra note 162, at 10 (citing United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 215
(4th Cir. 1972)).
166. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, supra note 164, at 2 (arguing that
Facebook’s argument “rests on the faulty premise that it is merely interactive computer service”).
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as publishers or speakers within the Act,167 thereby giving immunity to
those interactive servers from liability for content on their platforms.168
Section 230 of the CDA provides that when an internet service provider
publishes user-generated content, the provider is not implicated in the
way a traditional publisher would be implicated.169 Instead, liability is
retained in the content provider, which is “anyone who creates or
develops the content at issue.170 However, the service provider may lose
that protection if it created or developed the content.171 Although section
230 has been construed very broadly in the past—to the extent that the
underlying legal issue is rarely addressed—judges in recent years have
begun to consider the internet service provider’s actual involvement in
the content and conduct.172 For example, the Seventh Circuit of the U.S.
Court of Appeals defined the Craigslist platform as an interactive
computer service without the power to control editorial content, which
absolved them of liability for discriminatory posts on its platform.173
In August 2018, the DOJ filed a statement of interest in the NFHA
167. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
held liable on account of (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph
1.”).
168. See Ariana Tobin & Jeremy B. Merrill, Besieged Facebook Says New Ad Limits Aren’t
Response
to
Lawsuits,
PROPUBLICA
(Aug.
23,
2018,
12:48
PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-says-new-ad-limits-arent-response-to-lawsuits
[https://perma.cc/7MFA-QE8D] (“Raising the prospect of tighter regulation, the Justice
Department said that the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which gives immunity to internet
companies from liability for content on their platforms, did not apply to Facebook’s advertising
portal. Facebook has repeatedly cited the act in legal proceedings in claiming immunity from antidiscrimination law.”).
169. See Catherine Tremble, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social Networks’
Use of Machine-Learning Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 829 (2017) (“Section 230 of the
CDA provides that where an ISP hosts user-generated content, none of it—however illegal—
implicates the provider in the way a traditional publisher would be implicated. Instead, liability lies
with the ‘information content provider,’ a term that encompasses anyone who ‘create[s] or
develop[s]’ the content at issue.”).
170. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining the term “information content provider” as
“any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”).
171. See Tremble, supra note 169, at 829 (citing Chi. Laws’ Comm. for C.R. Under L., Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining the expansive liability afforded to
hosts of user generated content and how the liability protection may be lost)).
172. Id.; see also Benjamin Volpe, From Innovation to Abuse: Does the Internet Still Need
Section 230 Immunity?, 68 CATH. U. L. REV. 597, 605 (2019) (discussing recent court decisions
finding liability for internet intermediaries).
173. See Chi. Laws’ Comm. for C.R. Under L., Inc., 519 F.3d at 671–72 (taking a dim view of
the argument that Craigslist is liable because “nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone
to post any particular listing or express a preference for discrimination”).
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case, stating that—unlike Craigslist—the CDA did not apply to
Facebook.174 The Department argued that the allegations in the complaint
were sufficient to state a claim under the FHA, and Facebook’s argument
“rests on the faulty premise that it is merely an interactive computer
service.”175 According to the Department, Facebook’s motion to dismiss
should be denied because “the Complaint sufficiently alleged that
Facebook is an internet content provider and that it may be held to
account for that content.”176 The Department cited HUD’s statement on
the implementing regulations for § 3604(c): HUD believes that an FHA
violation “occurs whenever the advertiser determines the manner for
advertising because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
persons who receive or do not receive a publication . . . .”177 The
Department concluded that the regulations were intended to prevent
targeting of advertisements, noting that “unlawful discrimination can
occur through the choice of who receives an ad, regardless of whether the
content of the ad itself is facially discriminatory.”178
On August 13, 2018—around the same time that the Justice
Department filed their statement of interest—HUD reopened their case
against Facebook.179 The FHA provides that an aggrieved person may
file a complaint with the HUD Secretary alleging housing discrimination,
and the Secretary may file such a complaint on her own initiative.180 In
the Secretary-initiated complaint, HUD alleged that Facebook had
engaged in “[d]iscriminatory advertising, statement and notices” on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, and
disability “[t]hroughout the United States.”181 Specifically, the complaint
alleged that Facebook discriminates by enabling advertisers to restrict
which users receive housing-related ads. Facebook uses extensive user
data to classify its users based on protected characteristics, then its

174. Statement of Interest of the U.S., supra note 164, at 17 (arguing that in comparison to cases
where a party is entitled to CDA immunity, Facebook should be treated differently because it
“mines user data, some of which users must provide, and then actively classifies users based on
that data).
175. Id. at 2.
176. Id.
177. Fair Housing Advertisement Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 57,104 (Aug. 26, 1980).
178. Statement of Interest of the U.S., supra note 164, at 10.
179. See Timberg & Jan, supra note 162 (explaining HUD’s allegations against Facebook).
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i) (“An aggrieved person may, not later than one year after
an alleged discriminatory housing practice has occurred or terminated, file a complaint with the
Secretary alleging such discriminatory housing practice. The Secretary, on the Secretary’s own
initiative, may also file such a complaint.”).
181. Housing Discrimination Complaint at 1, Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Equal
Opportunity v. Facebook, Inc., FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8 (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/PIH/documents/HUD_01-18-0323Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E3ZJ-6NPM].
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advertisers may use those characteristics to tailor ads to certain groups.
For example, advertisers have included only men, excluded users with
disabilities, excluded potential residents who are affiliated with a
particular religion, race or national origin, or have limited the ads to be
viewed only by users with older offspring.182 Additionally, the complaint
alleged that Facebook promoted the “ad targeting platform with ‘success
stories’ for ‘finding the perfect homeowners,’ ‘attracting renters,’ and
‘personalized property ads.’”183
In August of 2018, the company announced it would be “removing
more than 5,000 ad target options” in an effort to “prevent misuse.”184
The company denied the change was in reaction to the lawsuits, and
stated that the categories had not been “widely used by advertisers to
discriminate and their removal is intended to be proactive.”185 The
majority of the target options that were removed were those that allowed
advertisers to exclude certain populations from viewing their
advertisements.186 Some of the removed categories are “Passover,”
“Evangelicalism,” “Native American culture,” “Islamic culture,” and
“Buddhism.”187 Facebook, however, did not remove any categories based
on age, sex, or zip code.188
Nevertheless, advertisement buyers stated that they were not
concerned by the changes because they could still exclude people of
certain races or ethnicities from seeing their ads by using similar terms
that were not removed.189 For example, if an advertiser wanted to exclude
Hispanic audiences, even if the term “Hispanic” was removed, they could
still use interests, such as “Telemundo interest” or “specific Hispanic
artists that are less known by other communities.”190 In an effort to
182. Id. at 2 (describing the extent Facebook’s features allow for discrimination in its
advertisements).
183. Id.
184. See Ben Lane, Facebook Cuts Thousands of Ad Targeting Options After HUDO Housing
Discrimination
Allegation,
HOUSING
WIRE
(Aug.
22,
2018,
5:44
PM),
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/46551-facebook-cuts-thousands-of-ad-targeting-optionsafter-huds-housing-discrimination-allegation/ [https://perma.cc/WP5T-F9RD] (describing the ad
targeting changes Facebook made).
185. See Tobin & Merrill, supra note 168 (discussing how the CDA could protect Facebook
from liability).
186. See Ilyse Liffreing, Facebook Moves to Cut 5,000 Targeting Options but Ad Buyers See
Workarounds, DIGIDAY (Aug. 22, 2018), https://digiday.com/marketing/facebook-cutting-5000targeting-options-advertisers-prepared-use-workarounds/ [https://perma.cc/7ZFS-38T6] (showing
that this policy is aimed at preventing discrimination).
187. Id.
188. See Tobin & Merrill, supra note 168 (reasoning that these demographics are important for
employment ads).
189. Liffreing, supra note 186 (noting ways that advertisers could get around the new system
to still exclude).
190. See id. (showing a particular example of how to exclude groups within the new rules).
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prevent such work-arounds, Facebook did not release a full list of the
removed targeting options.191 Additionally, in some instances targeting
categories have been used for nondiscriminatory purposes, such as Jewish
groups using the “Passover” category to advertise Jewish cultural events
or the Michael J. Fox Foundation using it to find people of Ashkenazi
Jewish descent for research on Parkinson’s disease.192
Facebook also announced it would require all U.S. advertisers using
the Facebook platform to comply with a nondiscrimination policy.
Previously, Facebook only required advertisers that it identified as
offering housing, employment, or credit ads to certify their compliance
with the nondiscrimination policy.193 Now, all U.S. advertisers will be
required to complete a certification, offered through the Ads Manager
tool, to continue advertising through the website.194 The certification is
designed to be educational and was developed to emphasize the
difference between acceptable and discriminatory ad targeting.195
HUD decided that third-party liability for internet advertising is within
its scope and should do the same for hate crimes. Currently, federal
housing laws are used to address hate crimes in limited instances, and
state regulations that do exist (in some states) or can be created to collect
information to help shape the proper laws and responses with respect to
hate crimes. However, a coherent federal agenda for housing-related
discriminatory violence is lacking and should be included in HUD’s
agenda.
IV. HATE CRIMES: IDENTIFICATION, PROSECUTION, AND
INCONSISTENCIES
A. Overview of §§ 3631 and 3617 of the Fair Housing Act
A hate crime, simply put, is a criminal offense against someone or
someone’s property motivated by an offender’s bias due to a victim’s
race, color, religion, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, gender,

191. See id. (demonstrating the ways in which Facebook is attempting to avoid advertisers
working around the new rules).
192. Tobin, supra note 168 (illustrating how targeted ads can be used for nondiscriminatory
purposes).
193. Lane, supra note 184.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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or gender identity.196 What distinguishes hate crime from other crimes is
the offender’s prejudicial motive or bias behind the criminal action.197
Two provisions of the Fair Housing Act address hate crimes and
housing: §§ 3617 and 3631 of Title 42 of the United States Code.198
Section 3631 provides the most common basis for prosecution of hate
crimes related to housing.199 It criminalizes “acting by force or threats of
force” to willfully injure, intimidate, or interfere with an individual’s
right to buy, sell, or rent housing based on their race, color, religion, sex,
disability, familial status, or national origin.200 The section further
protects those financing, contracting, or negotiating for such transactions
and those applying for or participating in “any service, organization, or
facility relating to the business of selling or renting dwellings . . . .”201
Although § 3631 does not require that the prosecution prove “that the
defendant intended to drive the victims out of the neighborhood,”202 they
must prove the defendant’s actions were motivated by the victim’s
membership in a protected class.203
Section 3631 “provides broad protection that covers almost any type
of intimidation directed at individuals in their homes.”204 Prosecutors
often refer to this section when the case involves a victim of a violent act
or harassment when acquiring housing, or in any act that is defined as
anti-integrationist.205 Anti-integrationist or move-in violence includes
“actions targeted at racial and ethnic minorities . . . whose moves to all-

196. See Shirlethia V. Franklin, Barbara Mack Harding & Becky Monroe, Combating Hate: A
National Campaign to Protect and Defend Targets of Hate, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
ARCHIVES,
EQUAL
JUSTICE
CONFERENCE
(2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/pro_bono_clearinghouse/ejc_2018_196
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC9Z-DK7L] (emphasizing that a hate crime is a criminal offense); see also
18 U.S.C. § 249 (a)(2) (criminalizing actions that willfully cause bodily injury to another because
of “actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
disability.”).
197. Franklin, Harding & Monroe, supra note 196 (showing that hate crimes are particularly
important with regard to the offender’s state of mind).
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3617, 3631.
199. See Jeannine Bell, Hate Thy Neighbor: Violent Racial Exclusion and the Persistence of
Segregation, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 47, 56 (2007) (“[T]he most common federal remedy is
prosecution under § 3631 of the Federal Fair Housing Act.”).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 3631.
201. Id.
202. See Bell, supra note 199, at 58 (stating that although there doesn’t need to be proof that
the defendant tried to drive someone out of a neighborhood, “defendants’ intentions seem clear”).
203. See Hate-Crimes Legislation: Local, State and Federal Perspectives, 24 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 371, 379 (2000) [hereinafter Hate-Crimes Legislation] (“[W]e have to show that the
defendants used force or threats of force” and “they were motivated by these factors.”).
204. Bell, supra note 199, at 57 (stating that § 3631 prohibits interference with a person’s right
to “buy, sell, or rent housing”).
205. Id. at 56–57.
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white neighborhoods prompted violent responses.”206
Section 3617 criminalizes actions that “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or
interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account
of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of” his or her
fair housing rights.207 Unlike § 3631, § 3617 requires that the prosecution
prove the defendant “intended to interfere with the activity of this victim
in relation to housing.”208 Like § 3631, § 3617 protects a broad range of
activities—occupying, selling, buying, renting, and even financing a
dwelling—and a broad range of people—the occupant, realtors,
landlords, and landowners selling their property.209 The Fair Housing Act
also protects the right to associate with others in one’s home.210
B. Hate Crimes in Selected Circuits
The circuits are split on the issue of “whether a section 3617 claim
must be predicated on a violation of sections 3603, 3604, 3605, or
3606.”211 The Second212 and Sixth213 Circuits have indicated in the
affirmative, while the Seventh,214 Eighth,215 Ninth,216 and Eleventh217
have found in the negative. The Tenth Circuit has yet to rule on the issue,
but at least one district court in the circuit has found that a claim need not
be predicated on such a violation.218 Guidance from HUD on addressing
hate crimes under the Fair Housing Act would assist with interpretation
of these laws.
206. Id. at 57.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
208. Hate-Crimes Legislation, supra note 203, at 379–80 (showing that prosecutors must also
point out the force or threats of force from the offender).
209. Id. at 380 (suggesting that § 3617 is meant to protect a variety of persons and scenarios).
210. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (“[I]t shall be unlawful . . . [t]o discriminate in the sale
or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a
handicap of . . . any person associated with that buyer or renter.”).
211. United States v. Pospisil, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1063 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
212. See Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 834 (2nd Cir. 1994) (finding that the alleged § 3617
claim of interference is “without a predicate”).
213. See Wells v. Rhodes, 928 F. Supp. 2d 920, 931 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (setting forth elements
required to have a § 3617 claim that include a violation of §§ 3603–3606).
214. See Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 123 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (reasoning that § 3617 can be
violated without any other FHA violation).
215. See Pospisil, 127 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (requiring a second violation would render § 3617
redundant).
216. See United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1994) (arguing that one
violation is enough).
217. See Sofarelli v. Pinellas Cnty., 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that plaintiffs
can prove violations of the Fair Housing Act through a § 3617 claim).
218. See Xiangyuan Zhu v. Countrywide Realty Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1233 (D. Kan.
2001) (“A violation of Section 3617 may be plead even absent other violations of the Fair Housing
Act.”).
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1. Sixth Circuit
A § 3631 violation in the Sixth Circuit has been found in a few cases
of race-motivated crimes designed to drive the victims from the
neighborhood,219 including cross-burnings.220 In Singer v. United States,
the defendant was convicted under § 3631 for burning a cross between
the houses of two black families and shouting “racially derogatory
remarks and threats.”221 The Sixth Circuit upheld the conviction,
rejecting defendant’s argument that the cross-burning was an expressive
act protected by the First Amendment.222
To assert a § 3617 claim in the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff must prove
“(1) that he exercised or enjoyed a right guaranteed by §§ 3603–3606; (2)
that the defendant’s intentional conduct constituted coercion,
intimidation, threat, or interference; and (3) a causal connection between
his exercise or enjoyment of a right and the defendant’s conduct.”223 The
Sixth Circuit employs a broad reading of § 3617, in which a claim is not
limited to defendants who used potent force or duress but may be made
against individuals who are “in a position directly to disrupt the exercise
or enjoyment of a protected right and exercise their powers with a
discriminatory animus.”224 To prevail on an interference claim under the
Fair Housing Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate a discriminatory
animus.225 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit applies similar analyses to Fair

219. See United States v. Mahan, 190 F.3d 416, 419 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming a conviction and
sentence under § 3631 when the defendant participated in “a conspiracy to oust an AfricanAmerican family from their home by littering their yard with approximately one hundred copies of
a hate flyer threatening physical violence.”); United States v. Wiegand, No. 93-1735, 1994 WL
714347, at *1, *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 1994) (affirming a conviction and sentence under § 3631 when
the defendant intentionally set fire to a house that was recently purchased by a black man and a
white man when the defendant said he burned the house “so that blacks could not move in”).
220. Singer v. United States, No. 94-3039, 1994 WL 589562, at *8 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1994);
United States v. Retford, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 14325, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 1984) (affirming
a conviction under § 3631 when the defendant “pleaded guilty to burning a cross in the front yard
of the residence of a Haitian family and to leaving a poem on their front porch which contained a
violent and racist message.”).
221. Singer, 1994 WL 589562, at *11.
222. Id.
223. Wells v. Rhodes, 928 F. Supp. 2d 920, 931 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (granting summary judgment
on § 1982, § 1985, and FHA claims brought against a defendant who burned a cross with “KKK
will make you pay” and the n-word written on it on plaintiffs’ lawn, because the plaintiffs belonged
to a protected class, there was no question that the defendant displayed discriminatory animus, the
defendant clearly interfered with the plaintiffs’ FHA rights, and “a reasonable jury could only
conclude that [the defendant’s] conduct was causally connected to [p]laintiffs’ enjoyment of their
right to rent their home”).
224. Id. at 932 (internal quotation omitted).
225. Id. at 931–32 (relying on HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 613 (6th Cir.
2012)).
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Housing Act discrimination claims as it does to § 1982 claims.226
The Sixth Circuit also employs a burden-shifting standard when
evaluating § 3617 claims:
[T]he plaintiff has the burden of production to demonstrate a prima
facie case of discrimination. The burden of production then shifts to the
defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken.
The burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to the
demonstrate that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason is, in fact, a
pretext for discrimination.227

In Byrd v. Brandeburg, the plaintiffs were African Americans, a fact
of which the defendant was aware.228 The defendant was found
“delinquent” in the juvenile court for the attempted arson, and the
Northern District of Ohio found that he “interfered with the plaintiffs’
exercise and enjoyment of their rights to fair housing.”229 The court
reasoned that the defendant failed to articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason, and there was compelling, undisputed evidence beyond that of the
prima facie case that the defendant’s acts were racially motivated because
the defendant routinely used racial slurs.230 Therefore, “there [was]
sufficient unrebutted direct evidence of racial animus in this record to
reject any [nondiscriminatory] explanation as a mere pretext racial
discrimination.”231
The Sixth Circuit also increases sentences for crimes against
vulnerable victims.232 In United States v. Salyer, the defendant and his
co-conspirator burned a cross on an African American neighbor’s
lawn.233 They were indicted on three counts: (1) conspiracy to violate the
constitutional rights of another citizen, (2) interference in housing rights
by threat or intimidation, and (3) use of fire in the commission of a
felony.234 Under a plea agreement, the defendant plead guilty to count

226. Id. at 932 (citing Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as
is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.”).
227. Byrd v. Brandeburg, 922 F. Supp. 60, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (holding that a finding of
delinquency for throwing a Molotov cocktail onto a front porch of an African American’s home
was sufficient for a prima facie discrimination case under § 3617).
228. Id. at 64.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 64–65.
232. United States v. Salyer, 893 F.2d 113, 115 (6th Cir. 1989).
233. Id. at 114.
234. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) (describing what constitutes a violation of the statute);
18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (explaining that it is illegal if “two or more persons conspire
to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate” another in the enjoyment of any privilege secured by the
Constitution or other laws).
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one, and counts two and three were dismissed.235 The district court
increased the defendant’s sentence by two levels for victim
vulnerability.236 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence
because the federally protected right in question was the FHA “right to
hold and occupy a dwelling without injury, intimidation or interference
because of race and color,” and “the defendant knew or should have
known that the [plaintiffs] were unusually vulnerable to the threat of cross
burning because they are black.”237
2. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has likewise upheld convictions under § 3631 in
cases of hate crimes that were designed to drive plaintiffs to leave
neighborhoods (typically black plaintiffs living in white neighborhoods).
In United States v. Hayward, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a conviction
under § 3631 when the defendants used racial slurs and burned two
crosses in front of a white family’s home.238 The family lived in an allwhite community and occasionally entertained black friends in their
home.239 The defendants were convicted of interference with housing
rights by force or threat of force.240 The Seventh Circuit found that “the
evidence showed that the defendants burned the crosses to tell those in
the [plaintiffs’] household . . . that black people were unwelcome in [the
community] and that association with blacks was not approved.”241 In
another Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Redwine, the defendants
were indicted for two counts of violating § 3631 for throwing rocks and
firebombs into the plaintiffs’ home and intentionally threatening and
harming them because they did not did not want the black family in a
white neighborhood.242
Seventh Circuit courts have also consistently applied § 3617 to

235. Salyer, 893 F.2d at 114.
236. Id.; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(“If the defendant knew or should have known that the victim of the offense was unusually
vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that the victim was particularly susceptible
to the criminal conduct, increase by 2 levels.”).
237. Salyer, 893 F.2d at 115.
238. United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1243–44, 1250 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
argument on appeal that cross burning is protected speech because “the act of cross burning also
promotes fear, intimidation, and psychological injury.”), overruled by United States v. Colvin, 353
F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2003).
239. Id. at 1243.
240. Id. at 1244; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3631(b) (explaining that it is illegal for an individual to
use force or threat of force in order to injure, intimidate, or interfere with another due to his race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin because the other is or has been
buying, selling, or renting property).
241. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1249–50.
242. United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 316 (7th Cir. 1983).
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“threatening, intimidating, or extremely violent discriminatory conduct
designed to drive an individual out of his home . . . typically, cases have
involved acts such as cross-burning, firebombing homes or cars, shooting
shotguns, physical assaults, or throwing Molotov cocktails.”243 In
Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp, the court found that the plaintiffs had
standing under both § 1982 as well as the Fair Housing Act for three
reasons.244 First, they had standing because they were alleging an injury
from the defendant’s conduct in that they had been prevented from “using
their property to its full extent” and had suffered harm including
“humiliation, embarrassment, emotional distress, and financial loss.”245
Second, the injuries could be redressed through a favorable judicial
decision. 246 And finally, the court held the plaintiffs had standing
because the “zone of interests” covered by § 1982 and the Fair Housing
Act encompassed the plaintiffs’ injuries.247
In the Seventh Circuit, plaintiffs make a prima facie case of racial
violence under §§ 3604(a) or 3617 by showing that (1) they were
members of a minority group, (2) the defendants knew they were
members of a minority group, (3) the defendants committed an act of
violence toward the plaintiffs’ home, and (4) the defendants’ action
“interfered with plaintiffs’ right to purchase and retain their
residence.”248 An “invidiously motivated” pattern of harassment—in
addition to the more “ominous, frightening, or hurtful” actions such as
cross burning or physically assaulting a neighbor—can satisfy element
four.249
Element four was further explained in Stackhouse v. DeSitter, in which
accusations of a firebombing of a family’s car to drive them from the

243. Whisby-Myers v. Kiekenapp, 293 F. Supp. 2d 845, 852 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (internal quotation
omitted); see United States v. Montgomery, 23 F.3d 1130, 1132 (7th Cir. 1994) (attempting to burn
a cross outside a residential treatment center with sixty percent black residents, located in an allwhite neighborhood); United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 780 (7th Cir. 1998) (burning a
cross in the yard of an interracial couple).
244. Whisby-Myers, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 853.
245. Id.
246. Id. (noting that a favorable judicial decision would indisputably remedy the harm suffered).
247. Id. (citing City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 122 (1981) (“[S]ection 1982 is
designed to protect ‘the right of black persons to hold and acquire property on an equal basis of
white persons.’”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (“It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”).
248. Waheed v. Kalafut, No. 86 C 6674, 1988 WL 9092, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 1988) (finding
the plaintiffs made a prima facie case under §§ 3604 and 3617 of racially motivated interference
with property rights by producing evidence that the defendants had been convicted in state court of
firebombing the plaintiffs’ home, and the defendants had committed other acts of racial intolerance,
such as banging on garbage cans and shouting racial epithets at the plaintiffs’ home).
249. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Fam. Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th
Cir. 2004) (describing the case as “far from a simple quarrel between two neighbors . . . .”).
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neighborhood were sufficient to state a claim under § 3617.250 The
plaintiff in Stackhouse claimed “that after he and his family exercised
their right to rent an apartment free of racial discrimination, as protected
by § 3604, [the defendant] attempted to frighten and drive them away
from the previously all-white neighborhood through acts of violence and
property damage.”251 The court found that “[s]uch conduct is squarely
within the range of actions prohibited by § 3617, whether or not any other
section of the Act was violated.”252 Additionally, even if a defendant had
not interfered with a potential plaintiff’s “initial exercise of his or her
right to rent or purchase housing free of racial discrimination,” it would
nonetheless be a violation of the statute to undertake later efforts to drive
the plaintiff out of such housing.253 A defendant’s later effort to drive the
plaintiff out of such housing will nonetheless run afoul of the statute
because it “specifically protects both the exercise and the enjoyment of
rights granted or protected by the substantive provisions.”254 Therefore,
a § 3617 claim in the Seventh Circuit is not dependent upon a violation
of any other section of the FHA.255
3. Ninth Circuit
To satisfy the third element of a violation of § 3631(a) in the Ninth
Circuit, the Government must prove “that the defendant acted with the
specific intent to injure, intimidate or interfere with the victim because of
her race and because of the victim’s occupation of her home.”256 In
United States v. McInnis, the defendant was convicted by a jury for
violating § 3631(a) after firing two shots into the residence of an African
American family, hitting a resident.257 On appeal, he argued that the
evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the intent element.258 The
court upheld the conviction because the defendant had made statements
before and after the shooting to support a finding of intent by the jury.259
The evidence showed that the defendant had made “racially derogatory
250. Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 239 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
254. Id. (holding that plaintiffs had stated a claim under § 3617 by alleging a cross burning in
their yard and the breaking of house windows).
255. See Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 123 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding the plaintiff stated a
claim under the FHA when she alleged “that defendants ignited her home to intimidate and coerce
her into moving out of the neighborhood because of her race . . . .”).
256. United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1992); see also United States v.
Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming a conviction under § 3631 after a crossburning incident because the “necessary intent is demonstrated by the evidence of racial animus.”).
257. McInnis, 976 F.2d at 1228.
258. Id. at 1230.
259. Id.
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remarks” and used racial slurs while gesturing toward the house.260 In
addition, evidence seized from the defendant’s house demonstrated “a
clear hatred and violent attitude toward African Americans” and
supported the finding that he acted based on the plaintiffs’ race and
intended to interfere with their occupancy of their residence.261
In United States v. Gilbert, the Ninth Circuit examined whether § 3631
applies to threats against an adoption agency.262 The defendant “allegedly
(1) drove an automobile at a black child; (2) verbally threatened a white
male who has a black step-brother; (3) ordered his dog to attack a black
child; and (4) spat in the face of a mentally retarded black child.”263 The
Ninth Circuit found that this section protects adoption agency workers
when they place minority children in a home because both the language
of the law and the case law support a broad interpretation of the section,
and the director of the agency was “aiding or encouraging” minority
children in the occupancy of dwellings.264
Although not discussing cases of hate crimes of move-in violence
specifically, the Ninth Circuit has also applied a broad interpretation to
§ 3617. In United States v. City of Hayward, the Ninth Circuit first
defined § 3617’s language “interfere with” to include “all practices which
have the effect of interfering with the exercise of rights under the federal
fair housing laws.”265 The Northern District of California later held that
“a § 3617 claim may be based upon discriminatory conduct which is
designed to drive the individual out of his or her home.”266 The court
noted that it had found little case law discussing application of § 3617 in
the context of a claim that was not directly related to the sale or rental of
property, and therefore declined to “interpret § 3617 more broadly to
cover any discriminatory conduct which interferes with an individual’s
enjoyment of his or her home[,]” reasoning that it was unaware of any
cases that applied the FHA in such a broad manner.267
Section 3617 protects two distinct groups of individuals. First, it
safeguards members of the protected class from coercion, intimidation,
threats, or interference in the exercise or enjoyment of their Fair Housing
Act rights.268 Second, it protects third parties, not necessarily members
of the protected class, who aid or encourage protected class members in
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir. 1987).
263. Id. at 1525.
264. Id. at 1527–28.
265. United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1994).
266. Egan v. Schmock, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
267. Id.
268. See, e.g., Stirgus v. Benoit, 720 F. Supp. 119, 120 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (firebombing of
plaintiff’s house).
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the exercise or enjoyment of their Fair Housing Act rights.269 However,
there are inconsistencies with this application. The plaintiff was protected
by the FHA in Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dept. of
Housing and Community Affairs, where the court stated, “if a plaintiff
establishes its prima facie case of discriminatory effect in an action for
racial discrimination under the FHA, discrimination is presumed.”270
Here, the court held:
Non-profit organization that secured housing in predominately
Caucasian neighborhoods for African Americans relying on
government assistance established prima facie case that state housing
authority engaged in disparate impact discrimination, in violation of
FHA, by disproportionately approving tax credits for non-elderly
developments in minority neighborhoods and disproportionately
denying tax credits for non-elderly housing in predominately Caucasian
neighborhoods, given evidence, including state legislative committee
report stating that housing authority disproportionately allocated federal
low income housing tax credits funds to developments located in areas
with above-average minority concentrations.271

FHA claims under § 3617 were also upheld where racial protests were
occurring in Charlottesville, Virginia.272 Sines v. Kessler held that
counterprotesters stated a claim for an FHA violation against defendants,
including white supremacist group members, which arose from injuries
sustained during a torchlight march at a white supremacist rally. The
plaintiffs, counterprotesters, alleged that “a torchlight march was
designed to intimidate racial minorities by replicating the Ku Klux Klan’s
and Nazi’s use of torches.”273
Violations of the FHA may be established either by proof of
discriminatory intent or a significant discriminatory effect.274 In Radcliffe
v. Avenel Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., the court said there was “insufficient
evidence” to support a violation of the plaintiff’s FHA claim, although
there was ample evidence of the plaintiff being called derogatory names
269. See, e.g., Wilkey v. Pyramid Constr. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1453, 1454 (D. Conn. 1985) (firing
a rental agency secretary for refusing to discriminate against minorities seeking housing); see Smith
v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1975) (firing managers of apartment complex for renting
to Mexican Americans).
270. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dept. of Hous. Cmty. Affs., 749 F. Supp. 2d 486,
489 (N.D. Tex. 2010); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3605(a) (explaining that it is illegal to discriminate in
the sale or rental of housing).
271. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d at 499; see also Fair Housing Act, 45 U.S.C.
(explaining that it is illegal to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing).
272. See German Lopez, The Most Striking Photos from the White Supremacist Charlottesville
Protests,
VOX
(Aug.
12,
2017,
11:43
AM),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/8/12/16138244/charlottesville-protests-photos [https://perma.cc/QS4V-P9JN] (highlighting that the protests included phrases like “white lives matter.”).
273. Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 801 (W.D. Va. 2018).
274. Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996).
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based on her Christian religion.275 Yet the court still found no intentional
discrimination.276 This factor of intentional discrimination is not easily
identified by some courts, further showing inconsistency. In the case of
McZeal v. Ocwen Financial Corp, the court stated that McZeal had not
sufficiently provided evidence that the defendant would not engage with
him in a real estate transaction for discriminatory reasons.277
C. States and Hate Crime Legislation
Hate crimes can also be addressed at the state level. However, as the
following section illustrates, the problem of inconsistency also exists
among states. Without a unified data collection or reporting process, there
will not be a complete set of information that can be used to mitigate hate
crimes.
Hate crime is still prevalent today and has not been stifled even as the
years go by, despite the many preventive steps taken. Of the hate crime
that exists today, more than half of hate crime victimizations are not
reported to the police.278 This low reporting rate is more than likely due
to the fact that not all states have hate crime laws and not all states collect
data on hate crimes.279
Most states have hate crime laws and require data collection on hate
crimes.280 A handful of states have hate crime laws but do not require
data collection on hate crimes.281 Only one state, Indiana, does not have
state hate crime laws but requires data collection of hate crimes.282 There
are several states and U.S. territories that have neither hate crime laws

275. Radcliffe v. Avenel Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 7:07-CV-48-F, 2013 WL 556380, at
*5–6 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 12, 2013).
276. Id. at *6.
277. McZeal v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 00-20817, 2001 WL 422375, at *1–2 (5th. Cir. Mar. 28,
2001). Thus, the claim under a § 3617 violation could not be sustained. Id.
278. Hate Crime Victimization, 2004–2015, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (June 2017),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hcv0415_sum.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JX9-3JEQ]; see also
Weiha Lu, Why Police Struggle to Report One of the Fastest-Growing Hate Crimes, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/11/26/why-police-struggle-toreport-one-of-the-fastest-growing-hate-crimes [http://perma.cc/D5JF-TYAL] (explaining the
reasons so many hate crimes go unreported).
279. Summary of State Laws and Policies Regarding Hate Crime and Data Collection, THE U.S.
DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/laws-and-policies [https://perma.cc/4MY2BWQD] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
280. Id. These states include Arizona, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington.
281. Id. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Puerto Rico, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
282. Id.
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nor require collection on hate crimes.283 Since many states do not have
hate crimes and others do not require collection of data on hate crimes,
this explains, in part, why more than half of the victims do not report the
hate crime and why it is difficult to grasp how prevalent hate crime is in
the United States.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics uses a National Crime Victimization
Survey (NCVS) to collect data on the amount of hate crime that occurs
throughout the nation.284 The survey measures crimes perceived by
victims to be motivated by bias against the victims for being in or
associating with a group identified by certain characteristics. 285 This is
different from the FBI statistics because this survey includes both
reported and unreported hate crimes.286 The main type of evidence that
the NCVS uses to classify a hate crime offense is the offender’s use of
hate language.287 Hate language was in almost all hate crime
victimizations during 2011 to 2015.288 From 2004 to 2015, U.S. citizens
experienced an average of 250,000 hate crime offenses, with no
statistically significant change in the rate of violent hate crime during that
eleven-year period.289 From 2011 to 2015, 48% of hate crime victims
were motivated by race, 35% were motivated by ethnicity, and 30% were
motivated by gender.290
The FBI, on the other hand, uses the Uniform Crime Reporting
program for its crime statistics. Both the NCVS and UCR measure similar
crime categories, like rape, burglary, robbery, theft, motor vehicle theft,
and aggravated assault.291 However, the UCR and NCVS depart in some
areas. The first difference is the purpose of the program. The UCR is
trying to offer reliable criminal justice statistics for managing and
operating law enforcement.292 Conversely, the NCVS attempts to provide

283. Id. These states and territories include American Samoa, Arkansas, Georgia, Guam,
Northern Mariana Islands, South Carolina, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Wyoming.
284. Hate Crime Victimization, 2004–2015, supra note 278 (highlighting that the NCVS tracks
data regarding victims who perceived the crime to be motivated by bias).
285. Id.
286. Id. (“Unlike the FBI data, which is based on hate crimes known to law enforcement, the
NCVS includes hate crimes both reported and unreported to police.”).
287. See id. (explaining that hate language was used as evidence of a hate crime in almost all
hate crime victimizations).
288. Id. (highlighting that hateful language was apparent in many hate crimes).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Harbani Ahuja, The Vicious Cycle of Hate: Systemic Flaws in Hate Crime Documentation
in the United States and the Impact on Minority Communities, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867, 1879
(2016) (citing Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
(2018), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 [http://perma.cc/G3BZ-WWM8]).
292. See id. (explaining the purpose of the UCR program).
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statistics about crimes that were not previously available.293 The NCVS
is likely a better option between the two when it comes to statistics
regarding hate crime since hate crime is a newer criminal sanction in most
states and not even available in all states.
Another interesting observation of the state hate crime laws is that
different types of state hate crime laws prohibit certain types of hate
crimes, but not others. For example, California and Washington, DC have
hate crime laws criminalizing offenses based on interference with
religious worship, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender,
gender identity, disability, political affiliation, and age.294 These two
states have the most hate crime laws compared to other states.295
Conversely, Arkansas only criminalizes interference with religious
worship.296 Excluding Arkansas, South Carolina, and states that do not
have hate crime laws in general, every state has a penalty enhancement
for crimes motivated by race, religion, or ethnicity.297 Lastly, of all the
hate crime laws, a penalty enhancement for crimes motivated by political
affiliation is the least prevalent among the states’ hate crime laws.298
Hate crime laws in the above-mentioned states primarily include “(1)
animus; (2) a defendant who belongs to one identity group and a victim
who belongs to a different group; and (3) a choice of victim that is largely
symbolic, such that one victim is interchangeable with, and serves as a
representative of, other members of the victim’s identity group.”299
However, even when all three elements to a hate crime are present,
prosecutors may still be reluctant to charge the defendant with a hate
crime. For example, where adding a hate crime charge will not have any
legal effect, meaning the hate crime charge could not elevate the sentence

293. See id. (explaining the purpose of the NVCS program).
294. State by State Hate Crime Laws, WASH. BUREAU - NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/Hate-Crimes-laws-by-state.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRJ6-WULA] (last
visited Aug. 16, 2020); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55 (West 2005) (listing the actual or
perceived victim characteristics that will qualify a criminal act against a victim as a hate crime);
D.C. CODE § 22-3701 (2020) (“Bias-related crime . . . demonstrates an accused’s prejudice based
on the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal
appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, family responsibility, homelessness,
physical disability, matriculation, or political affiliation of a victim of the subject designated act.”).
295. State by State Hate Crime Laws, supra note 294 (providing a chart demonstrating that
California and Washington, DC have the most hate crime laws).
296. Id. (providing a chart demonstrating that Arkansas only criminalizes interference with
religious worship).
297. Id. (providing a chart demonstrating that most states have a penalty enhancement for
crimes motivated by race, religion, or ethnicity, except Arkansas, Utah, and states with no hate
crime laws).
298. Id. (providing a chart demonstrating that only six states have penalty enhancements for
crimes motivated by political affiliation).
299. Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 860 (2014).
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any higher, prosecutors will generally not bring the charge.300
Prosecutors may wish to charge more offenders under hate crime laws,
but they also worry about their efficiency in prosecuting crimes.301
Prosecutors may have a difficult time proving animus in general; but even
if they could prove animus, they still have to consider whether the hate
crime will add any meaningful time to the sentencing.302 This issue could
be solved with hate crime laws that have a substantial penalty in addition
to the underlying crime. However, the problem with implementing
harsher punishments can be seen in New York. New York’s hate crime
statute also covers age, where anyone over sixty is a protected class.303
Prosecutors from the Elder Fraud Unit have included hate crime charges
where defendants have swindled elderly people.304 Despite no evidence
of animus, prosecutors bring this claim because it turns a theft of less than
$1 million into a possible prison sentence of one to twenty-five years
under hate crime laws.305 Thus, hate crime laws turn into the most
appealing charge for prosecutors and most used, even where there is no
identity-based animus, which dilutes the hate crime’s intended message
of promoting group tolerance.306
300. Id. at 863 (citing No Hate Crime Charges After Brutal Attack, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2006,
2:49 PM) (referencing a case in which a prosecutor did not add a hate crime charge since it would
not elevate the defendant’s sentence)); see also Tamara F. Lawson, Whites Only Tree, Hanging
Nooses, No Crime: Limiting the Prosecutorial Veto for Hate Crimes in Louisiana and Across
America, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 123, 131 (2008) (arguing to restrict
the use of prosecutorial “veto” power in hate crime prosecution).
301. Eisenberg, supra note 299, at 863–64 (explaining that prosecutors may be concerned with
the efficiency of charging hate crime offenders since it can be difficult to prove animus and hate
crime convictions may barely elevate a sentence, if at all); see also Shirin Afsous, Proving Hate:
The Difficulties of Successfully Prosecuting Bias-Motivated Crimes, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 273, 291 (2016) (explaining that prosecuting hate crimes is challenging due to the
difficulty of building rapport with victims and finding enough evidence to show the defendant was
motivated by animus, and that this animus caused him to commit the hate crime).
302. Eisenberg, supra note 299, at 863–64 (explaining that proving animus is difficult and might
not even result in an elevated sentence).
303. Id. at 895–96; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (McKinney 2008) (highlighting that age
is included in New York’s protected categories).
304. Eisenberg, supra note 299, at 896 (citing Anne Barnard, A Novel Twist for Prosecution of
Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2010) (describing New York cases in which defendants singled
out elderly people for crimes like mortgage fraud, believing they were more vulnerable targets));
see also Gregory C. Pavlides, Economic & Environmental Crimes Bureau, QUEENS DIST. ATT’Y’S
OFF., http://www.queensda.org/economiccrimes.html [https://perma.cc/85JF-WC52] (last visited
Aug. 18, 2020) (describing the Elder Fraud Unit as a unit created in response to an increase in
financial crimes against the elderly); Irene Byhovsky, Financial Crimes Against the Elderly as a
Hate Crime in New York State, 81 ALB. L. REV. 1139, 1148 (2017) (arguing that financial crimes
targeting vulnerable populations, like the elderly, deserve more systemic attention).
305. Eisenberg, supra note 299, at 895–96 (citing Barnard, supra note 304) (describing a case
in which Queens prosecutors charged two women with stealing more than $31,000 from three
elderly men).
306. Eisenberg, supra note 299, at 896 (comparing the vulnerable victim statutes to other more
lenient hate crime statutes).
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Another obstacle in prosecuting hate crimes starts on the ground.
Police officers’ and law enforcement’s discretion comes into play in
prosecuting and reporting hate crime.307 Law enforcement has a difficult
task of investigating the predicate or underlying offense, while
simultaneously identifying a bias in the crime.308 It becomes more
difficult when the bias implicates First Amendment issues and when the
bias is unclear.309
In this similar vein, hate crime legislation has constitutional issues.310
Opponents of hate crime statutes argue they infringe First Amendment
rights by punishing individuals for exercising their right to free speech.311
Two cases have offered some insight on this topic, but there are some
gray areas that still need to be clarified. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, the
United States Supreme Court found that the motive for a hate crime can
be separated from constitutionally protected speech.312 This only pertains
to penalty enhanced provisions for hate crimes in a state sentencing
statute.313 It is still unclear whether this applies outside the penaltyenhancing area of hate crime.314 In another case, the Court suggested that
307. Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1883–84 (2016) (citing Laura Meli, Note, Hate Crime and
Punishment: Why Typical Punishment Does Not Fit the Crime, U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 936 (2014)
(arguing that police officer enforcement is essential to hate crime prosecution)); see also Lawson,
supra note 300, at 128 (arguing that police officers are the first to decide which crimes will be
investigated and prosecuted through their discretionary law enforcement).
308. Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1884 (explaining the challenge further by discussing the need
for evidence of bias as motivation).
309. Id.; see also Afsous, supra note 301, at 277 (explaining that some critics of hate crime
legislation raise concerns of First Amendment implications).
310. Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1884 (highlighting that First Amendment issues are particularly
difficult); see also Gregory R. Nearpass, The Overlooked Constitutional Objection and Practical
Concerns to Penalty-Enhancement Provisions of Hate Crime Legislation, 66 ALB. L. REV. 547,
554–55 (2003) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (focusing on a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to penalty-enhancement provisions and striking the statute)).
311. Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1885 (citing Jeannine Bell, Deciding When Hate Is a Crime: The
First Amendment, Police Detectives, and the Identification of Hate Crime, 4 RUTGERS RACE & L.
REV. 33, 34 (2002) (noting that one of the most serious problems of controlling hateful behavior is
to do so “without offending the First Amendment by silencing speech”)); see also Amy Dieterich,
The Role of the State Attorney General in Preventing and Punishing Hate Crimes Through Civil
Prosecution: Positive Experiences and Possible First Amendment Potholes, 61 ME. L. REV. 521,
540 (2009) (examining whether state hate crime laws are permissible regulations of speech under
the First Amendment).
312. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 476 (1993) (upholding, unanimously, Wisconsin’s
hate crime statute); see also Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1885
313. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 490; Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1885; see also Tracey L. Coghill,
Wisconsin v. Mitchell: The Debate between Hate Crime Statutes and Freedom of Speech Continues,
45 MERCER L. REV. 1475, 1476 (1994) (arguing that states should model hate crime enhancement
statutes after Wisconsin’s).
314. Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1885 (claiming that Mitchell offered little guidance on whether
state statutory schemes that make misconduct with bigoted motives a crime in and of itself); see
also Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment for Prejudice: A Commentary on the Constitutionality and
Utility of State Statutory Responses to the Problem of Hate Crimes, 39 S.D. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
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hate crimes are difficult to identify and separate from politically protected
speech.315 There still exists a debate as to whether hate crimes can be a
legitimately separate class of crimes, independent from penaltyenhancing hate crime statutes.316
At the state level, there are two main hurdles that disrupt hate crime
statutes. First, varying state statutes lead to inaccurate statistics.317 With
different statutes in each state, the statistics are skewed since not all states
are reporting the same hate crimes and not all states have the same hate
crimes.318 Second, varying reporting requirements for law enforcement
agencies prevent accurate statistics of hate crimes.319 Roughly eighty
percent of law enforcement agencies that report to the UCR report zero
hate crimes.320

315. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (stating that politicians are
allowed to express hostility, but not through the imposition of limitations on people who disagree).
316. Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1886 (stating there is further debate about whether hate crime
statutes are constitutional); see also Lu-In Wang, Recognizing Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 80 B.U.
L. REV. 1399, 1409–10 (2000) (“[L]aw enforcement officers and prosecutors recognize only a
narrow set of cases as ‘real’ bias crimes because they perceive only those cases to have been driven
by the hatred they assume the laws are designed to condemn.”).
317. Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1889 (citing MICHAEL SHIVELY, STUDY OF LITERATURE AND
LEGISLATION
ON
HATE
CRIME
IN
AMERICA
iii
(2005),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/210300.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C9p5-WV8y])
(“Differences between state and federal hate crime definitions create differences in reported levels
of hate crime. For example, Wyoming has no hate crime statutes, yet five hate crimes were reported
in the 2002 Uniform Crime Reports. It is likely that the predicate crimes (e.g., vandalism) were
locally recorded as conventional crimes, and the hate-motivated nature of the crime was noted
elsewhere and reported as such to the UCR. It is also possible that some or all of the five hate crimes
were reported to local law enforcement, and then were subsequently referred to federal
authorities.”); see also Ken Schwencke, Why America Fails at Gathering Hate Crime Statistics,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-america-fails-at-gatheringhate-crime-statistics [https://perma.cc/C2Zl-CJ3Z] (noting that variations in a state’s definitions of
hate crimes may contribute to underreporting).
318. Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1886 (explaining that state law enforcement data is not consistent
because state hate crime statutes vary considerably).
319. Id. at 1890 (citing SHIVELY, supra note 317, at 28) (“For example, Connecticut General
Statutes § 29-7 mandates collection of data on ‘all crimes motivated by bigotry or bias,’ and states
that the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety shall monitor, record, and
classify all crimes committed in the state which are motivated by bias.”); see also Ronald L. Davis
& Patrice O’Neill, The Hate Crimes Reporting Gap: Low Numbers Keep Tensions High, THE
POLICE
CHIEF
(May
2016),
https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/the-hate-crimes/
[https://perma.cc/YT99-QEVE] (arguing that if hate crime data is not accurate, law enforcement
will not know how prevalent hate crimes are and will not allocate enough resources to preventing
it).
320. Ahuja, supra note 291, at 1890 (stating that although eighty percent of law enforcement
agencies participate in the UCR, a handful still do not); see, e.g., Hate Crime Statistics by
Jurisdiction, Table 14, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hatecrime/2018/topic-pages/jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/YVH5-A9VS] (showing all the jurisdictions
which reported zero hate crimes for the 2018 year across all fifty states, hundreds of counties, and
dozens of universities).
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V. RECONCILING AND RECONSTRUCTING HUD’S RESPONSE TO HATE
CRIMES
Remedies protecting housing rights are a crucial part of civil rights
law. With respect to anti-integrationist violence, behavior directed at
racial and ethnic minorities integrating white neighborhoods may be
punished under a variety of types of federal and state law. The broad
protections against interference under the FHA have been used to
prosecute racial violence in a variety of contexts. “For instance, §§ 3617
and 3631 of the FHA have been used to prosecute a variety of violent
acts, including cross burnings, fire bombings, vandalism, assault, and
threats targeted at racial and ethnic minorities and whites in the exercise
and enjoyment of their fair housing rights.”321 This part will suggest how
HUD can integrate hate crime into its agenda, and that based on best
practice suggestions for local agencies, it should do so.
The National Fair Housing Alliance’s rapid response network supports
addressing hate crimes through an existing framework.322 This rapid
response network has three golden rules.323 First, “[a]lways collaborate
with law enforcement.”324 Law enforcement is there to provide assistance
and keep the peace. Second, “[a]lways interact with the existing structure
or protocol for hate crime response.”325 This network is supposed to make
the existing structure and protocol better and more efficient, not replace
it. And third, “[a]lways focus on victim healing and reconciliation.”326
Using existing housing laws, HUD can address hate crimes in its agenda
using these rules as guidelines, especially since the Fair Housing Act has
twin missions of integration and antidiscrimination.
HUD could promote an anti-hate agenda through data collection
efforts. One way this can be achieved is by requiring data collection
regarding hate crimes from local housing authorities that administer
public housing and tax credit housing programs. These agencies and the
states they are in should also have protocols for hate crime prevention in
order to receive federal funding for housing assistance. Reporting would
help to provide information that HUD could use to address hate crime
and bias-motivated violence. If HUD expects private actors, such as
Facebook, to take action in reexamining the advertising platform and
321. Jeannine Bell, The Fair Housing Act and Extralegal Terror, 41 IND. L. REV. 537, 548
(2008).
322. See generally PowerPoint Presentation on Housing-Related Hate Activity, NAT’L FAIR
HOUSING ALLIANCE (Oct. 2019)
323. See id. (stating how important it is for people in the community to connect with those who
are involved in hate crime prevention).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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business model in order to adhere to fair housing laws, HUD should set
an example by directly addressing hate crimes in the housing context. The
Facebook lawsuit exemplifies the importance of data in understanding
discriminatory intent. Recognizing disparate impact under the FHA also
relies on the significance of data. A baseline requirement in
understanding if people are able to reside in their neighborhoods is
understanding if external, violent forces are causing them to move out, or
prohibiting them from moving in. In addition to state collection and
reporting requirements, the Department of Justice and FBI oversight is
necessary to ensure the accuracy of the state-reported statistics.
HUD can also require states to implement proactive educational
training to federal housing recipients in order to receive federal funding
for housing.327 Also, requiring states to enact rehabilitative educational
training to convicted hate crime offenders in order to receive federal
funding for housing would greatly improve proper responses to hate
crimes.328
Finally, it is of paramount importance that a HUD Secretary be
appointed who is aware of how detrimental and impactful hate crime can
be on a community. This would be pivotal to incorporating hate crime
into a fair housing agenda.
CONCLUSION
The number of incidents of move-in violence is partly affected by the
fact that there are so many potential spaces for anti-integrationist
violence. Almost by definition, move-in violence is a byproduct of U.S.
housing segregation—without segregated white neighborhoods, there
would not be move-in violence. In fact, housing segregation by race is a
problem of great magnitude in the United States. The growing racial
diversity of the United States has not been matched by an increase in
diversity within neighborhoods. The problem of segregation is
particularly severe in the case of African Americans in comparison to
whites. Though black-white segregation declined during the 1980s, the
majority of black people continue to live in locations starkly isolated from
those of other races.329 “The 2000 U.S. Census results revealed that
327. See Meli, supra note 307, at 962 (arguing that proactive education could expose future
offenders and nonoffenders to different cultures, which could deter would-be offenders from
committing hate crimes).
328. See id. (stating that rehabilitative educational training should be required with the hate
crime penalty enhancement).
329. See William H. Frey, Black-White Segregation Edges Downward Since 2000, Census
Shows, BROOKINGS INST.: THE AVENUE (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/2018/12/17/black-white-segregation-edges-downward-since-2000-census-shows/
[https://perma.cc/Z6N3-PQTG] (showing that after the passage of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, the
segregation between black and white people began to decrease).
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blacks were hypersegregated—the most extreme form of segregation—
in twenty-eight of the fifty largest metropolitan areas in the United
States.”330 The FHA had broadly integrationist aims. A broad reading of
the FHA’s legislative history suggests the Act was an attempt to pave the
way for significant nationwide housing integration. In order to align with
this intention, hate crime eradication should be a priority of HUD and
supported by a secretary who explicitly states this in the department’s
agenda. Enhancing data collection efforts to better understand the
magnitude of the problem and to create effective solutions will reduce the
racial intimidation that people of color face in their homes. The
government’s affordable housing goals and programs cannot be achieved
long-term if ongoing harassment and violence make it impossible to live
in integrated communities.

330. Bell, supra note 199, at 67 (stating that even as segregation declined, black people were
still very isolated from people of other races); see also Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor,
Racial Segregation in the 2000 Census: Promising News, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 2001),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/racial-segregation-in-the-2000-census-promising-news/
[https://perma.cc/ML9Z-PGWB] (analyzing racial segregation in roughly 300 metropolitan
statistical areas using 2000 census districting files); Douglas S. Massey & Jonathan Tannen, A
Research Note on Trends in Black Hypersegregation, 52(3) DEMOGRAPHY 1025, 1026 (June 2015)
(showing how Chicago, for example, has many hypersegregated neighborhoods).

